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Abstract
As hardware performance and dependability have dramatically improved in the past few decades,
the software dependability issues are becoming increasingly important. Unfortunately, many stud-
ies show that software bugs, which inevitably slip through various bug detection methods and even
the strictest testing before releasing, can greatly affect software dependability during production
runs. To improve software dependability during production runs, this dissertation proposes to ad-
dress software bugs at multiple levels by leveraging support from the underlying hardware, the OS
kernel, and the middle-layer runtime.
The proposed multi-level defenses address software bugs and their effects at different stages
of program execution. The first-level defense detects software bugs once they are triggered. The
detection at the earliest stage can effectively prevent further propagation of errors that are caused
by the software bugs. It would be perfect if we could detect all the software bugs at the first-level
defense. However, some bugs may still slip through the first-level defense and may be exploited
by security attacks. The second-level defense is to detect the exploitation of software bugs in order
to control the system damage caused by the potentially exploited bugs. Due to the limitation of
the tools or methods deployed in the first-level and second-level defenses, some bugs may still
escape them. Additionally, without any further actions for the detected bugs or exploitations at
the previous two levels of defenses, what the target system can do is to shut down itself to prevent
potential damages, thus is unavailable to users. At this point, the third-level defense recovers the
program from software bugs and their effects, thus providing non-stop services. In short, the multi-
level defenses complement each other to effectively address software bugs during production runs.
More specifically, in each level of defense, this dissertation proposes a novel low-overhead
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method to address software bugs during production runs by leveraging support from the hardware,
OS, or the runtime. In the first-level defense, this dissertation proposes a low-overhead tool, called
SafeMem, to detect memory leaks and memory corruption bugs, two major forms of software
bugs that severely threaten system availability and security. It does not require any new hardware
extensions. Instead, SafeMem makes a novel use of existing ECC memory technology and exploits
intelligent dynamic memory usage behavior analysis to detect memory leak and corruption bugs.
The experiments with seven real-world applications show that SafeMem detects all tested bugs
with very low overhead (only 1.6%-14.4%), 2-3 orders of magnitudes smaller than Purify, a well-
known bug detection tool.
In the second-level defense, this dissertation proposes a low-overhead, software-only informa-
tion flow tracking system, called LIFT, to detect the exploitation of software bugs. Without requir-
ing any hardware changes, LIFT minimizes runtime overhead by exploiting dynamic binary trans-
lation and optimizations for detecting various types of security attacks. More specifically, LIFT
aggressively eliminates unnecessary dynamic information tracking, coalesces information checks,
and efficiently switches between target programs and instrumented information flow tracking code.
The experiments with two real-world server applications, one client application and eighteen at-
tack benchmarks show that LIFT can effectively detect various types of security attacks. LIFT also
incurs very low overhead, only 6.2% for server applications, and 3.6 times on average for seven
SPEC INT2000 applications. The proposed dynamic optimizations effectively reduce the overhead
by a factor of 5-12 times.
In the third-level defense, this dissertation proposes an innovative technique, called Rx, which
can quickly recover programs from many types of software bugs, both deterministic and non-
deterministic. The idea, inspired from allergy treatment in real life, is to roll back the program to a
recent checkpoint once failure, triggering or exploitation of software bugs that are detected at the
first two level of defenses, and then re-execute the program in a modified environment. This idea
is based on the observation that many bugs are correlated with their execution environments, and
therefore can be avoided by removing the “allergen” from the environment. Rx requires few to no
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modification to applications and provides programmers with additional feedback for bug diagnosis.
The experiments with four server applications that contain six bugs of various types show that Rx
can survive all the six software failures and provide transparent fast recovery within 0.017-0.16
seconds, 21-51 times faster than the whole system program restart approach for all but one case
(CVS).
v
To my wife, Yuan,
and my parents, Shouren and Xiaoqiu
vi
Acknowledgments
I owe biggest thanks to my adviser Yuanyuan Zhou. Every time I need her feedback or suggestion,
she would always be there. She inspires and influences me not only on research, but also on many
other aspects of my life. She plays a key role at two turning points of my life. I will never forget
her words: “Do not look at the bar, look at the sky!”
Thanks also go to the other members of my dissertation committee, Professors William Sanders,
Lui Sha, and Josep Torrellas, for their time and insightful feedback. I would like to thank Professor
Darko Marinov and Indranil Gupta for insightful comments on the presentation of my work.
I thank all members in the Opera group. I enjoyed the inspiring research atmosphere. I would
pay special tribute to Joseph Tucek, Zhenmin Li, Shan Lu, and Pin Zhou, whom I happily collabo-
rated with in several projects. Zhifeng Chen, Qingbo Zhu, Weihang Jiang, Xiao Ma, Lin Tan, and
Vivek Pandey bounced ideas with me and provided valuable comments on my papers.
I would like to thank researchers in Intel labs, Youfeng Wu, Cheng Wang, Ho-seop Kim, Chen
Yang, and Xiaofeng Li for discussing many research ideas with me and providing me feedback on
the LIFT project. I also want to extend thanks to Cezary Dubnicki in NEC research lab for his
kindness in helping me on my intern project then.
I could not thank enough my dearest parents in China. I spent my precious eighteen years
with them and shared many exciting moments with them. They taught me many things during
those years. They used to and will always support me. I would like to thank my brother and
sister-in-law, who take care of my parents in China and compensate a lot for my absence.
Last but not least, special thanks to my dearest wife Yuan, for her enormous support. She made
my PhD process a pleasant journey!
vii
Table of Contents
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Software Dependability During Production Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Dependability is Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Software Bugs Affect Dependability During Production Runs . . . . . . . 2
1.1.3 Software Bugs Inevitably Exist in Production Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.4 Scope of Software Bugs in This Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Addressing Software Bugs During Production Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 The Evolution Process of Triggered Software Bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Desired Characteristics of Online Tools for Fighting Software Bugs . . . . 6
1.2.3 State of The Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Dissertation Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Multi-Level Defenses for Software Bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Software Bug Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Software Bug Exploitation Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Surviving Software Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 3 First-Level Defense: Detecting Memory Bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Low-Overhead Monitoring of Memory Accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.1 ECC Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2 Using ECC to Monitor Memory Accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Detecting Memory Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1 Characteristics and Classification of Continuous Memory Leaks . . . . . . 30
3.3.2 Detection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Detecting Memory Corruptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
viii
3.6.1 Microbenchmark Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6.2 Overall Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6.3 Benefits of ECC Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6.4 Effects of ECC-Protection in False Pruning for Memory Leaks . . . . . . . 40
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter 4 Second-Level Defense: Detecting Bug Exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.2 Highlight of LIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 LIFT Basic Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.1 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Tag Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.3 Information Flow Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.4 Exploit Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.5 An Example of Information Flow Tracking for LIFT-basic . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.6 Protection of Tag Space and LIFT Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 LIFT Binary Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.1 Fast Path (FP) Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.2 Merged Check (MC) Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3.3 Fast Switch (FS) Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5.1 Security Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5.2 Performance Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter 5 Third-Level Defense: Surviving Software Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1.2 Highlights of Rx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Main Idea of Rx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3 Rx Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3.1 Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3.2 Checkpoint and Rollback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.3.3 Environment Wrappers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3.4 Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3.5 Control Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Design and Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.6 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.6.1 Overall Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.6.2 Recovery Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6.3 Rx Time and Space Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ix
5.6.4 Benefits of the Failure Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
x
List of Tables
3.1 Tested applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Time for the ECC system calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Time overhead (%) comparison between SafeMem and Purify . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Space overhead (%) comparison between ECC- and page-protection approaches . . 40
3.5 False memory leaks reported before and after using ECC-protection . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 An example of information flow tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Applications and security exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Results of LIFT for attack benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Throughput and Response Time of Apache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 Possible environmental changes and their potentially-avoided bugs . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Applications and bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Overall results: comparison of Rx and two alternative approaches . . . . . . . . . 91
5.4 The average space overhead per checkpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Methods of reducing software bugs prior to releasing software . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The Evolution Process of Triggered Software Bugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Read/Write operations for ECC memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Implementation of WatchMemory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Stability of maximal lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 Information flow tracking for three different instructions in LIFT-basic . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Distribution of four groups of tag propagation in Apache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 An example of the FP and MC optimizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Overall Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5 The check version execution percentage for SPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.6 Memory Check Number Reduction for SPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1 Rx: The main idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 Rx architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3 Proxy in normal and recovery mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4 Throughput and average response time of Squid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5 Throughput and average response time with different bug arrival rates . . . . . . . 95
5.6 Rx overhead with different checkpoint intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.7 Rx recovery time for the first and subsequent bug occurrences . . . . . . . . . . . 97
xii
Chapter 1
Introduction
As hardware performance and dependability have dramatically improved in the past few decades,
the software dependability issues are becoming increasingly important. Unfortunately, many stud-
ies show that software bugs, which inevitably slip through various bug detection methods and even
the strictest testing before releasing, can greatly affect software dependability during production
runs. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, software bugs cost the
U.S. economy an estimated $59.5 billion annually, or approximately 0.6% of the gross domestic
product!
To improve software dependability during production runs, this dissertation proposes to ad-
dress software bugs at multiple levels by leveraging support from the underlying hardware, the OS
kernel, and the middle-layer runtime.
1.1 Software Dependability During Production Runs
1.1.1 Dependability is Important
High dependability [ALRL04] is demanded by many programs, including both low-end and high-
end software. For low-end software such as our daily use calendars and email clients, low depend-
ability, e.g., frequent program crashes, may frustrate and annoy users, thus lead to business losses.
Even more important is dependability for high-end software such as mission-critical applications
and many Internet servers since they affect millions of users at the same time and can lose millions
of dollars in hours or even minutes. According to a report from Gartner Group [Sco98], the cost of
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one hour downtime of financial applications exceeds six millions US dollars. With the tremendous
development of Internet and computer systems, almost every kind of organizations is becoming
dependent upon highly dependable systems.
1.1.2 Software Bugs Affect Dependability During Production Runs
Unfortunately software bugs can greatly affect system dependability, e.g. availability, reliability,
and security. A number of studies [Gra86, Gra90, Sco99, OGP03, MS00] in various types of
computer systems have shown that software bugs are one of the major causes of system failures.
For the deployed Tandem systems, Gray’s report in 1986 [Gra86] shown that software bugs caused
25% of system failures. Later in 1990, when more data was available, Gray reported that software
bugs caused 55% of system failures [Gra90]. Similarly, Oppenheimer et.al. studied three large-
scale Internet servers in 2003 and reported that software bugs account for 24% of the root causes
of system failures [OGP03].
More specifically, software bugs can hurt system availability and reliability. During program
execution, the software bugs, triggered in the exercised execution path, may cause system crashes,
hang, or other unexpected system misbehavior. There are many instances of software bugs affect-
ing system availability and reliability in the real world. For example, the recently-happened Tokyo
stock exchange system crash [Her05] in November 2005 is because of a software bug. It lasted for
around four hours and paralyzed the whole trading business in Tokyo then.
Additionally, software bugs such as buffer overflow severely threaten computer system security.
These bugs allow malicious users to launch security attacks by executing arbitrary code, causing
denial of service, or stealing confidential data from a vulnerable system. For example, the fastest-
ever worm, Slammer worm in 2003, exploited the buffer overflow bug in Microsoft SQL servers. It
brought down tens of thousands of machines within several minutes and cost hundreds of millions
of dollars loss [MPS+03].
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Figure 1.1: Methods of reducing software bugs prior to releasing software
1.1.3 Software Bugs Inevitably Exist in Production Runs
As Figure 1.1 shows, many approaches or techniques have been proposed to prevent or detect
software bugs before software products are released. They can be classified into four categories.
The approaches in the first category use type-safe languages such as Java or the Microsoft Common
Language Runtime Environment [Mic] to prevent or alleviate certain types of software bugs such
as memory leaks and buffer overflow. While these approaches can improve code quality, they are
not applicable to performance-critical software such as server programs due to significant runtime
overhead. In addition, type-safe languages usually do not allow fine-grained manipulation of data
structures. As a result, most performance-critical software programs are still written in type-unsafe
languages such as C or C++.
Static program analysis tools, such as LCLint [EGHT94], PREfix [BPS00], METAL [HCXE02],
Clouseau [HL03], CSSV [DRS03], etc., belong to the second category. They scan the program
source code at compile time and detect various types of software bugs such as memory leaks and
NULL pointer dereference through program analysis techniques. While these tools do not impose
runtime overheads, they may miss a lot of bugs and/or generate many false alarms because accu-
rate runtime information is unavailable at compile time. Furthermore, some of these tools require
annotations, which many programmers find too tedious.
The third category of tools leverages model checking techniques, such as SPIN [Hol97], Verisoft [God97],
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CMC [MPC+02], etc, to detect subtle software bugs that may be triggered only under some intri-
cate sequence of events. Model checking tools are effective to find those subtle software bugs by
systematically exploring the possible system states with or without specification. However, the
state explosion problem, a major limitation, results in undisclosed software bugs in the vast of
unexplored states. Furthermore, the conventional model checking tools [Hol97] requires building
an abstract specification, i.e., the model, which is a time-consuming and error-prone process.
The fourth category of approaches, software testing and dynamic detection tools such as Val-
grind [NS03] and Purify [HJ92a], are common practice in software companies for detecting soft-
ware bugs. While they can detect some software bugs, some still slip through even the strictest
testing because of two reasons. First, they can only detect bugs on the exercised execution paths.
However, it is nearly impossible to test all execution paths because the problem of generating a
complete test suite that covers all execution paths is theoretically uncomputable [Rop94]. Second,
many commonly used dynamic detection tools such as Purify [HJ92a] incur large runtime over-
heads, slowing down a program by up to 40 times [CHM+03a, ZLF+04]. This factor deteriorates
the limited execution path coverage problem in software testing.
In summary, software bugs cannot be eliminated during software development processes and
inevitably exist in released software products. Therefore, addressing software bugs during produc-
tion runs is a crucial task for improving software dependability.
1.1.4 Scope of Software Bugs in This Dissertation
This dissertation does not aim for all types of software bugs during production runs. Before talk-
ing about the scope of software bugs addressed in this dissertation, we need a way to classify
software bugs. So far there is no standard way to classify software bugs although several different
ways [Bei90, LLC06] were proposed. As prior work [LLQ+05], this dissertation classifies soft-
ware bugs into three categories: 1) memory-related bugs, which are caused by improper memory
manipulation, including buffer overflow, memory leak, dangling pointer, etc. 2) concurrency bugs,
which are related to incorrect synchronization among multiple threads or processes, including data
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race, deadlock, etc. 3) semantic bugs, which are incorrect implementation of the original design
and may cause wrong functionality, for example, incorrect handling of corner cases.
This dissertation focuses on handling memory-related bugs although part of the work also deal
with some concurrency bugs. The reason for memory-related bugs is that they are commonly hap-
pened ones and usually cause severe security problems. According to the US-CERT Vulnerability
Notes Database [US-06], 39% of all reported vulnerabilities since 1991 were caused by memory
leak or memory corruption, and 55% of the most severe vulnerabilities were related to them. In the
year of 2003, these two types of memory-related bugs contributed to 68% of the CERT/CC [CER]
advisories.
1.2 Addressing Software Bugs During Production Runs
1.2.1 The Evolution Process of Triggered Software Bugs
To address software bugs during production runs, we first need to understand the evolution process
of software bugs as shown in Figure 1.2. At first, some software bug (or fault) is triggered during
program execution. Here, the triggering of a software bug means executing the statement that
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contains the software bug. After the triggering of a software bug, the program state becomes
erroneous. In some fields such as fault tolerance, the triggering of a software bug indicates the
transition from faults to errors. For example, a triggering of buffer overflow bug means that some
memory area out of boundary is being accessed.
The triggered software bugs may or may not be exploited by malicious users for launching
security attacks at some point later during program execution. Generally, the bug exploitation is
a method to launch security attacks as long as the bug triggering is a necessary condition for the
launched attacks. Here, we define the bug exploitation as the execution point when the program
control flow is being switched to some unexpected program location that indicates the launch of
security attacks. For example, stack smashing [One96] attacks usually exploit buffer overflow
bugs to corrupt the return address with carefully-crafted program location. Once the function
returns, the program will switch to some hijacked malicious code instead of the original parent
function. At this point, we call the bug exploitation happening.
Along with program further execution, there are several possible results of the triggered soft-
ware bugs, being either exploited or not exploited. If the software bug is exploited, the malicious
users may do some harmful things such as compromising the target system, launching denial-
of-service attacks, leaking sensitive information, building backdoors/Trojan [Tro06] for future
attacks, etc. If the triggered software bug is not exploited by security attacks, the bug may mani-
fest itself in various ways, such as, crashing/hanging the systems and delivering incorrect results
to users, etc., or keep itself silent until the system normally terminates.
1.2.2 Desired Characteristics of Online Tools for Fighting Software Bugs
Addressing software bugs is a very challenging task. Different from in-house testing, the online
tools should have some desired characteristics as follows.
• Low overhead. End-users usually are reluctant to deploy tools that may cause high runtime
overhead to their production systems. For example, Purify [HJ92a], a very popular bug
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detection tool, is only used for in-house testing instead of production runs because it can
cause up to 40 times slowdown. This low overhead characteristic is especially important for
server programs since bad server performance can affect millions of users at the same time.
• No assumption on source code availability. The tools or methods for production runs should
be able to deal with binary code without relying on the help from source code. Usually,
end-users only have binary distribution of the commercial software. Often times tools also
need to deal with third-party libraries that end-users do not have source code. It makes
the task more difficult without source code information as source code may provide useful
information such as data types that are absent in binary code.
• Low cost. Our tools or methods should not rely on hardware extension since non-trivial hard-
ware extension is expensive and takes time to implement. Some hardware approaches [ZQL+04,
PT03] can improve software dependability while achieving good performance, while they
are not available to existing systems due to non-trivial hardware extension.
1.2.3 State of The Art
A number of approaches have been proposed to improve software dependability during production
runs by online detection of software bugs, online detection of security attacks that exploit software
bugs, or recovery from software failures. The following part of this section summarizes the state-
of-the-art such approaches and their limitations. More details are discussed in Section 2.
Online detection of software bugs. To overcome the large runtime overhead problem incurred
by software-based dynamic bug detection tools such as Purify [HJ92a] and Valgrind [NS03], prior
studies proposed several methods with the support from either static analysis technique [NMW02,
CHM+03a, GMJ+02] or hardware extension [PT03, ZQL+04, ZLF+04]. CCured [NMW02] and
Cyclone [GMJ+02] use static analysis to enforce a strong type system whenever possible and insert
necessary runtime checks where static analysis cannot guarantee the type system. However, these
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tools require pointer-object associations in order to check safety of pointer references. In addi-
tion, they require non-trivial changes to applications’ source code to conform to their C standards.
Other methods such as iWatcher [ZQL+04] and AccMon [ZLF+04] propose hardware extension
for detecting software bugs. Although they usually incur very low runtime overhead, requiring
non-trivial hardware extension makes them not applicable for existing systems.
Online detection of security attacks. Many tools or techniques [CPM+98, CBBKH01, CBJW03,
sta06, BST00, XKPI02] were proposed to detect specific types of security attacks such as stack
smashing [One96] and format string [tf800] at runtime. However, they are limited to those spe-
cific types of security attacks. Program randomization [XKI03] transforms system-compromising
attacks to probable system crashes by diversifying program software layout at load time. Program
shepherding [KBA02] leverages dynamic binary translation mechanisms to enforce some general
security policies at runtime. Statistical intrusion detection methods [Far03] capture various in-
variants such as system call sequence invariants and mark violation of those invariants as security
attacks. Although the program randomization, program shepherding, and statistical methods are
not limited to several specific types of security attacks, they provide little information regarding the
attacks, e.g., what are the attack input signatures, what are the attack steps, etc. This information
is essential for building security rules in the intrusion detection and prevention systems such as
Snort [Sno06].
Several recent work [CCC+05, NS05, SLZD04] demonstrated that information flow tracking is
a promising and effective technique to effectively detect a wide range of security attacks. Generally
this technique tags (labels) the input data from unsafe channels such as network connections as
“unsafe” data, propagates the data tags through the computation (any data derived from unsafe
data are also tagged as unsafe), and detects unexpected usages of the unsafe data that switch the
program control to the unsafe data as exemplified in the stack smashing attack. However, either
high runtime overhead or dependence on hardware extension makes existing information flow
tracking systems unsuitable for production runs of existing systems.
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Online recovery from failures. To increase software availability during production runs, many
approaches are proposed to recover programs from failures caused by software bugs. Micro-
rebooting [CCF+02, CKF+04] proposed to reboot the failed components instead of the whole
system to minimize the system unavailable time. However, they cannot deal with deterministic
bugs such as memory bugs since the deterministic bug will occur again after restart given the same
input. Some application-specific methods such as multi-process model used by Apache [Apa06]
and n-version programming [AC77, Avi85, RCL01] require non-trivial restructuring to existing
programs. Additionally, n-version programming is prohibitively expensive so that it is unafford-
able for most of the applications. Ammann and Knight’s diversity-data system [AK98] may be
useful for non-deterministic bugs, it typically cannot survive deterministic bugs such as buffer
overflow and double free. For example, the related points of a very long input string are likely
long so that they will still cause buffer overflow. Additionally, the diversity-data system method is
not suitable for many applications that do not have accurate specifications for generating logically-
equivalent input data points. Recently, Rinard et al. proposed failure-oblivious computing to
recover programs from buffer overflow bugs and Sidiroglou et al. proposed reactive immune sys-
tem [SLBK05] to confine errors within a certain program region such as a function. In addition,
Demsky et al. [DR03, DR05] proposed to online repair fatal errors of important data structures
via static specification or AI methods. While these approaches are fascinating and may work for
certain types of applications, they are unsafe to use for correctness-critical applications (e.g. on-
line banking systems) because they “speculate” on programmers’ intentions, which can lead to
program misbehavior.
In summary, prior work made progress on improving software dependability by addressing
software bugs during production runs. However, they still suffer several limitations: requiring
non-trivial modifications on source code or existing hardware, too specific for certain attacks or
no enough information about attack signatures, and unable to address software bugs or unsafe
speculation on program execution.
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1.3 Dissertation Contributions
During program execution, once a software bug (fault) is triggered, we usually have a short period
of time to handle it before it may cause system misbehaviors such as crashes or producing wrong
results. Prior study [GKIY03] on Linux kernel’s behavior under errors shows that nearly 40% of
crash latencies are within 10 cycles and around 80% of crash latencies are within 100,000 cycles.
To improve software dependability during production runs, this dissertation proposes to ad-
dress software bugs at multiple levels by leveraging support from the underlying hardware, the OS
kernel, and the middle-layer runtime.
1.3.1 Multi-Level Defenses for Software Bugs
As shown in Figure 1.2, to maximize the chance of improving software dependability during pro-
duction runs, this dissertation proposes to address software bugs at multiple levels by leveraging
support from the underlying hardware, the OS kernel, and the middle-layer runtime.
The First-Level Defense. Once a software bug is triggered in the exercised execution path, it
would be the most effective if we can catch it on the spot since we can prevent the system state er-
ror, which caused by the triggered software bug, from further propagation and affecting the whole
system state. For example, we can prevent the corrupted memory data from further polluting other
data once we catch the buffer overflow bug on accessing the out-of-bound memory. Additionally,
detecting software bugs at this early stage could provide more detailed information about the soft-
ware bug itself, usually the root cause, for program recovery and further diagnosis. For example,
the more detailed information about a buffer overflow could be which memory buffer is overflowed
and which instructions cause this overflow.
At this level, this dissertation proposes a low-overhead tool, called SafeMem, to detect memory
leaks and memory corruption bugs, two major forms of software bugs that severely threaten sys-
tem availability and security. Instead of relying on any new hardware extension, SafeMem makes
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a novel use of existing ECC memory technology to provide low-overhead, fine-grained memory
monitoring functionality to user-level applications. Combined with the proposed intelligent dy-
namic memory usage behavior analysis, SafeMem can detect memory leaks and memory corrup-
tion bugs with very low overhead and few to no false positives. Furthermore, SafeMem requires
no modification to applications. Our evaluation of SafeMem with seven real-world applications
that contain memory leak and memory corruption bugs show that SafeMem detects all the tested
bugs with very low overhead (only 1.6%-14.4%), 2-3 orders of magnitudes smaller than Purify,
a well-known bug detection tool. This indicates that SafeMem can be deployed for the first-level
defense for production runs.
The Second-Level Defense. Unfortunately, some software bugs may still slip through the detec-
tion deployed in the first-level defense. For example, SafeMem cannot deal with double free bugs,
buffer overflow bugs of local variables in the stack, etc. These software bugs could potentially be
exploited by malicious users for launching security attacks. Therefore, it is essential to deploy the
second-level defense to catch exploitation of software bugs since at least it can help to control the
system damage that can potentially be caused by security attacks. Additionally, this level defense
may provide useful information regarding to the malicious input such as the bug-exploiting input
signatures, which can be used for filtering out future messages that match with attack signatures.
At this level, this dissertation proposes a low-overhead, software-only information flow track-
ing system, called LIFT, to detect the exploitation of software bugs. Without requiring any hard-
ware changes, LIFT minimizes runtime overhead by exploiting dynamic binary translation and
optimizations for detecting a wide range of security attacks. More specifically, LIFT aggressively
eliminates unnecessary dynamic information flow tracking, coalesces information checks, and ef-
ficiently switches between target programs and instrumented information flow tracking code.
I implemented LIFT on top of a dynamic binary translation framework in Windows. The real-
system experiments with two real-world server applications, one client application and eighteen
attack benchmarks show that LIFT can effectively detect various types of security attacks. LIFT
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also incurs very low overhead, only 6.2% for server applications, and 3.6 times on average for
seven SPEC INT2000 applications. The proposed dynamic optimizations effectively reduce the
overhead by a factor of 5-12 times.
The Third-Level Defense. Once software bugs or the exploitation are detected in the first-level
or second-level defense, the system could be forcefully terminated to prevent system damage.
Even worse, some software bugs may slip through the first two level defenses and cause system
failures such as crashes. As mentioned in Section 1.1, low availability could mean a big loss of
productivity and business. Therefore, at this point, it is important to deploy the third-level defense
to recover programs from software bugs and their bad effects. As a result, the third-level defense
helps increase service availability and provide non-stop services to users.
In this level, this dissertation proposes an innovative safe technique, called Rx, which can
quickly recover programs from many types of software bugs, both deterministic and non-deterministic.
The idea, inspired from allergy treatment in real life, is to rollback the program to a recent check-
point once failure, triggering or exploitation of software bugs that are detected at the first two level
defenses, and then re-execute the program in a modified environment. This idea is based on the
observation that many bugs are correlated with their execution environment, and therefore can be
avoided by removing the “allergen” from the environment. Rx requires few to no modification to
applications and provides programmers with additional feedback for bug diagnosis.
We conducted experiments with four server applications that contain six bugs of various types,
including heap buffer overflow, stack buffer overflow, double free, uninitialized read, dangling
pointer, and data race. The results show that Rx can survive all the six software failures and
provide transparent fast recovery within 0.017-0.16 seconds, 21-51 times faster than the whole
system program restart approach for all but one case (CVS).
In summary, with support from the underlying hardware, the OS kernel, and the middle-layer
runtime, this dissertation proposed multi-level defenses can effectively improve software depend-
ability during production runs by addressing software bugs.
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1.4 Outline
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior work on software
bug detection, software bug exploitation detection, and surviving software failures. Chapter 3
presents SafeMem in the first level defense, which uses ECC memory to detect memory leak and
memory corruption bugs. Chapter 4 focuses on LIFT in the second level defense, a low overhead
dynamic information tracking system to detect exploitation of software bugs. Chapter 5 discusses
Rx in the third level defense, using system support to survive software failures during production
runs. Chapter 6 summarizes this dissertation and discusses future research direction.
The materials in some chapters have been or will be published as conference papers. The
materials in Chapter 3 have been presented in [QLZ05]. The materials in Chapter 4 will appear in
[QWL+06]. The materials in Chapter 5 have been presented in [QTSZ05].
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter reviews previous work on software bug detection, software bug exploitation detection,
and surviving software failures.
2.1 Software Bug Detection
Researchers proposed many software bug detection tools or techniques, which can be classified
into three categories: static program analysis, model checking, and dynamic detection. While
tools in the first two categories can be used during software development, dynamic detection tools
may be used before or after software deployment.
Static program analysis. Generally tools in this category [EGHT94, FTA02, DLS02, HCXE02,
BPS00, DRS03, HL03] scan the program source code and use various static analysis techniques
to detect potential software bugs. Evans’s LCLint [EGHT94] detects the inconsistency between
the source code and properties inferred from user-provided annotations. Foster et al. proposed
CQual [FTA02], a general framework for checking program invariants specified by customized
type qualifiers. Similarly, METAL [HCXE02] checks the source code and detect violations of
programming rules, either provided by programmers [ECCH00] or automatically inferred from
the source code itself [ECH+01]. Some tools are designed to detect certain types of bugs such as
memory leaks and memory corruption. Clouseau [HL03] detects memory leaks using an object
ownership and inference model, while CSSV [DRS03], proposed by Sagiv et al., detects unsafe
string operations in C programs with the aid of procedure summaries.
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While static tools do not impose runtime overheads, they may miss a lot of bugs and/or generate
many false positives because accurate runtime information is unavailable at compile time. Recently
proposed SAFECode [DKA06] by Dhurjati et al. can enforce alias analysis for weakly typed
language, thus guarantee the soundness of some bug detection methods. However, SAFECode
cannot help reduce many false positives generated by many static methods. Furthermore, some
of these tools require annotations or summarizes, which impose extra burden on programmers.
Besides common limitations, different static tools may have their own limitations. For example,
Clouseau cannot handle type casting, pointer arithmetic, arrays of pointers, address of a pointer
member field in a class or structure, concurrent execution and exception handling [HL03].
Model checking. Typically, model checking tools check system properties at the protocol
level [McM93, Hol97, DDHY92] or the implementation level [God97, VHBP00, BMMR01, MPC+02]
by exhaustively searching the system state space. Traditional model checking tools such as SMV [McM93]
and SPIN [Hol97] focuses on verifying hardware and software protocols. Although they can de-
tect non-trivial bugs, the requirement of building a model for the system in another language is the
major drawback due to the required significant amount of manual effort that can easily lead errors.
Some recent software model checking tools such as Verisoft [God97] and CMC [MPC+02]
systematically execute and check the systems in the implementation level. They have been used
to check systems for concurrency bugs, e.g., deadlock, and assertion failures. Yang et al. applied
the model checking method to widely-used, heavily-tested file systems and found serious software
bugs [YTEM04]. Without requiring an abstract model for checking a target system is a big advan-
tage. However, the state explosion problem is still a major obstacle for them, especially for large
and complex systems, due to enormous state space need to be explored and limited computation
resources.
Dynamic detection. Dynamic tools, either purely based on software [HJ92b, NS03, CHM+03b,
ABS94, JK97, SBN+97] or relying on hardware extension [PT03, ZQL+04, ZLF+04], detect
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software bugs at runtime. The state-of-the-art tools Purify [HJ92b] and Valgrind [NS03] detect
memory-related bugs such as memory leaks and memory corruption by intercepting every memory
access and monitoring every dynamically allocated memory objects through binary instrumenta-
tion. Jones and Kelly’s tool [JK97], PointGuard [CBJW03], SafeC [ABS94] and CRED [RL04]
can detect buffer overflows by dynamically checking each pointer dereference. While these tools
do not suffer from the same limitation as static tools, most software-based detection tools incur
high runtime overhead, up to 40 times [CHM+03a, ZLF+04] due to interception of every mem-
ory/pointer access.
Some hybrid schemes combine static and dynamic technique to alleviate the high overhead
problem to some extent. CCured [NMW02, CHM+03a] is such a hybrid bug detection tool. It
first attempts to enforce a strong type system in C programs via static analysis. Portions of the
program that cannot be guaranteed by the CCured type system are instrumented with run-time
checks to monitor the safety of executions. Cyclone [GMJ+02] is very similar. It changes the
pointer representation to detect pointer dereference error. However, these tools require pointer-
object associations in order to check safety of pointer references. They fail when such associations
are not available (due to fine-grained pointer manipulation through various type-casting) or when
the bug does not violate pointer-type/object association (such as a wrong pointer assignment bug
caused by copy-paste). In addition, they require non-trivial changes to applications’ source code
to conform to their C standards.
Another direction to reduce runtime overhead incurred by software-based dynamic bug detec-
tion tools is to rely on hardware support. Some tools, such as ReEnact [PT03], iWatcher [ZQL+04],
AccMon [ZLF+04], etc., propose hardware extension to support bug detection. Even though they
usually incur very low runtime overhead, requiring non-trivial hardware extension to the existing
microprocessor makes them not applicable for existing systems.
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2.2 Software Bug Exploitation Detection
Many tools or techniques [CPM+98, CBBKH01, CBJW03, sta06, BST00, XKPI02] were proposed
to detect specific types of security attacks such as stack smashing [One96] and format string [tf800]
at runtime. Cowan et al. proposed StackGuard [CPM+98] for detecting stack smashing attacks by
storing a special guard value in the added “canary” of the stack for each function and checking
the guard value right before exiting the function. In addition to pure software approaches, Xu
et al. proposed architecture-supported schemes [XKPI02] for defending stack smashing attacks.
LibSafe [BST00] enhances some library functions that are known to be vulnerable with extra
checks against buffer overflow, the direct cause of stack smashing attacks.
Some techniques [XKI03, Far03, KBA02] detect general types of security attacks through var-
ious mechanisms. Program randomization [XKI03] transforms system-compromising attacks to
probable system crashes by shuffling program regions such as the stack region and the heap re-
gion in the memory during program load time. Thereby, once under attack, the program control
flow jumps to some bizarre location and the program very likely crashes instead of being compro-
mised. Statistical intrusion detection methods [Far03] capture various invariants such as system
call sequence invariants and mark violation of those invariants as security attacks. Programming
shepherding [KBA02] leverages dynamic binary translation mechanisms to enforce the security
policies at runtime. All these techniques are not limited by some specific types of security attacks
or software vulnerabilities. However, they provide little useful information regarding the attacks,
for example, what are the attack input signatures, what are the attack steps, etc. This information
is very useful for network-based applications to filter out future messages that match with attack
signatures.
Recently, information flow tracking [Den76, DD77, HR98, Mye99, ML00, CCC+05, NS05,
SLZD04, XBS06] has been demonstrated as a promising technique for detecting many system-
compromising attacks, even for unknown types of exploits and software vulnerabilities. Generally,
this technique tags the input data from unsafe channels such as network connections as “unsafe”
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data, propagates the data tags through the computation, and detects unexpected usages of the un-
safe data. Along this line, Vigilante [CCC+05] and TaintCheck [NS05] use dynamic binary in-
strumentation methods for the information flow tracking and incur large runtime overhead, up to
40x slowdown [NS05]. The hardware approach [SLZD04] proposed by Suh et al. can avoid the
high overhead incurred by the pure software approaches. Xu et al. proposed a source code level
instrumentation [XBS06] for the implementation that can alleviate high overhead problem to some
extent. However, it cannot track information flow in third-party library code and thereby will miss
security exploits involving these libraries.
2.3 Surviving Software Failures
Much research has been conducted on surviving software failures caused by deterministic bugs
and non-deterministic bugs in the past decades.
Surviving failures caused by non-deterministic bugs Whole program restart [Gra86, SC91]
is usually the first attempt to handle software failures with the hope that they are caused by non-
deterministic bugs since non-deterministic bugs may disappear during re-execution. However, it
may cause a long period of service unavailability [BBG+89, VDB+98] for server programs that
buffer significant amount of state in main memory (e.g., data buffer caches). Software rejuvenation
[HKKF95, GPTT97, BS98] is an interesting approach to reduce the period of unexpected service
outage by rejuvenating/restarting the software to a fresh state after a certain period and before
it fails. Recently Candea et al. proposed Micro-rebooting [CCF+02, CKF+04] to address this
problem to some extent by only rebooting the failed components.
General checkpointing and recovery mechanisms [BBG83, EAWJ02, RLT78] have been pro-
posed for surviving failures for a while. Typically, they checkpoint the program state, roll back
the program upon failures, and then re-execute the program. The checkpoints may be done to
disk [CPL97, JZ88, LNP90, WHV+95], non-volatile or persistent memory [LC98], or even re-
18
mote memory [ACZ00, ZCL99, PLP98]. These checkpoints can be provided with relatively low
overhead. If there are messages and operations in flight, logging is also needed [Bir96, LC97,
LCC00, JZ90]. To deal with resource exhaustion or operating system crashes, monitoring, log-
ging and recovery can be done remotely via support by special network interface cards [BNG+04].
Wang et al. proposed progressive retry [WHF93], an interesting improvement over traditional
checkpointing approaches. It increases the chance of surviving software failures that are related
to message orders since reordering messages may increase non-determinism during re-execution.
Ammann and Knight proposed a diversity-data system [AK98] to tolerate failures by increasing
non-determinism via a set of related input data points that are logically equivalent. While manip-
ulating input data may be useful for non-determinitistic bugs, it typically cannot survive determin-
istic bugs such as buffer overflow and double free. For example, the related points or reordering of
a very long input string are likely long so that they will still cause buffer overflow.
Some application-specific recovery mechanisms such as the multi-process model (MPM) can
be used to handle software failures caused by non-deterministic bugs. For example, the old version
of the Apache HTTP server [Apa06] spawns a new process for each client connection and therefore
can simply kill a failed process and start a new one to handle a failed request. It is simple, but
requires programs to be failure-aware.
Surviving failures caused by deterministic bugs Various fault tolerance mechanisms can be
used to survive software failures caused by deterministic bugs, a major cause of software fail-
ures [CC00]. The recovery blocks approach [HLMSR74, Ran75] extends a conventional block
with a means of error detection and additional alternates, i.e., different implementation versions of
the same block. The alternate will be executed upon a failure detected at the end of a block execu-
tion. Similarly, n-version programming [AC77, Avi85, RCL01] relies on different implementation
versions of the same software unit. Unlike recovery blocks, it executes different versions con-
currently and the result is a consensus result from all the versions. Both mechanisms can address
software failures caused by deterministic bugs assuming that different implementation versions fail
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independently. However, they are too expensive to be deployed in the normal software develop-
ment process.
Two recently proposed, non-conventional approaches are failure-oblivious computing [RCD+04]
and the reactive immune system [SLBK05]. Failure-oblivious computing proposes to deal with
buffer overflows by providing artificial values for out-of-bound reads, while the reactive immune
system returns a speculative error code for functions that suffer software failures. While these
approaches are fascinating and may work for certain types of applications, they are unsafe to use
for correctness-critical applications (e.g. on-line banking systems) because they “speculate” on
programmers’ intentions, which can lead to program misbehavior.
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Chapter 3
First-Level Defense: Detecting Memory
Bugs
3.1 Overview
The first-level defense is to detect software bugs once they are triggered during production runs.
This chapter proposes a low-overhead tool, called SafeMem, to on-the-fly detect memory leaks
and memory corruption bugs, two major forms of software bugs that severely threaten software
reliability. According to the US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database [US-06], 39% of all reported
vulnerabilities since 1991 were caused by memory leaks or memory corruption, and 55% of the
most severe vulnerabilities are related to them.
Memory leaks, caused when some allocated memory is never accessed again, can cumulatively
degrade overall system performance by increasing memory paging. Even worse, they may cause
programs to exhaust system resources, eventually leading to program crashes [HJ92b]. For this
reason, malicious users often exploit memory leaks to launch denial-of-service attacks. Memory
corruption, on the other hand, damages memory content through buffer overflow, incorrect pointer
arithmetic, or other types of program errors. Similar to memory leaks, memory corruption bugs,
especially buffer overflows, are commonly exploited by Internet attacks to attach malicious code
through carefully-crafted input data.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, dynamic detection is commonly used by programmers to detect soft-
ware bugs, including memory leaks and memory corruption. Dynamic detection can be performed
either in software or with hardware support. Purify [HJ92b] is a state-of-the-art software-only
dynamic tool for detecting memory leaks and memory corruption. However, Purify and most other
software dynamic tools have a major limitation: incurring high run-time overhead. Sometimes
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these tools can slow down a program by up to 40 times [CHM+03a, ZLF+04]. Therefore, they
cannot be used during production runs. iWatcher [ZQL+04] is a recently proposed architectural
extension to reduce overheads for dynamic monitoring, but it requires hardware extensions and
therefore cannot be used in existing systems.
This chapter proposes a low-overhead dynamic tool called SafeMem to detect memory leak
and memory corruption on-the-fly during production runs. To reduce runtime overheads without
relying on new hardware extension, it makes a novel use of existing Error-Correcting Code (ECC)
memory technology and provides low overhead memory access monitoring. In addition, Safe-
Mem exploits intelligent dynamic memory usage behavior analysis to detect memory leaks and
use ECC-protection to prune false positives. To detect memory corruption bugs, SafeMem use
ECC-protection to monitor illegal accesses, both to freed memory buffers and to the two ends of
allocated memory buffers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the ECC memory and
our novel use of this technology. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the methods to detect memory
leaks and memory corruption, respectively, followed by the evaluation methodology in Section 3.5.
Experiment results are presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 summarizes SafeMem.
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3.2 Low-Overhead Monitoring of Memory Accesses
3.2.1 ECC Background
Error-Correcting Code (ECC) memory is commonly used in modern systems, especially server
machines, to provide error detection and correction in case of hardware memory errors. It is an ex-
tension of simple parity memory, which can detect only single-bit errors. In contrast, ECC not only
detects single-bit and multi-bit errors, but it also corrects single-bit errors on the fly, transparently.
Unlike parity memory, which uses a single bit to provide protection to eight bits, ECC uses larger
groupings: 7 bits to protect 32 bits, or 8 bits to protect 64 bits [Int]. For convenience, we call such
a block of 32 bits or 64 bits an ECC-group. ECC requires special chipset support. When supported
and enabled, ECC can function using ordinary parity memory modules; this is the standard way
that most motherboards with ECC support operate. The chipset “groups” together the parity bits
of memory modules into the 7 or 8-bit block needed for ECC.
Most ECC memory controllers support four modes: Disabled, Check-Only, Correct-Error and
Correct-and-Scrub. In the Disabled mode, the memory controller disables all the ECC functional-
ities. In the Check-Only mode, the memory controller detects and reports single-bit and multi-bit
errors, but it does not correct them. With the Correct-Error mode enabled, the memory controller
not only detects single-bit and multi-bit errors, but it also corrects single-bit errors. This mode im-
proves data integrity by seamlessly correcting single-bit errors. With the Correct-and-Scrub mode
enabled, the memory controller not only detects and corrects errors, but it also scrubs memory
periodically to check and correct hardware errors. This mode provides the highest data integrity.
ECC memory works as shown in Figure 3.1. At a write to memory, the memory controller
encodes the involved ECC-groups using some device-specific coding algorithms. The ECC “code”
(7 or 8 bits) is stored with the data in memory. At a read to memory, or during memory scrubbing,
the memory controller reads the involved ECC-groups, including both data and ECC codes. It
also recomputes the ECC codes based on the data just read and compares it with the stored ECC
codes. If they mismatch, the memory controller automatically corrects single-bit errors, and reports
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multi-bit errors to the processor using an interrupt, which is delivered to the operating system.
To handle an ECC-error interrupt current operating systems, including both Linux and Mi-
crosoft Windows, simply go to the panic mode or the blue screen and report an error message to
the end-user. The user has to reboot the machine to solve the problem.
3.2.2 Using ECC to Monitor Memory Accesses
Main Idea
SafeMem makes a novel use of ECC memory to monitor memory accesses for software debug-
ging. More specifically, it leverages ECC memory for two purposes: (1) detecting illegal accesses
(e.g., out-of-bound memory accesses, or accesses to freed memory buffers) to monitored memory
locations; (2) pruning false positives in memory leak detection. More details about each specific
usage are described in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.
Both usages require detection of accesses to some monitored memory locations. To achieve
this goal, SafeMem uses ECC protection in a way similar to page protection, which is commonly
exploited in shared virtual memory systems [Li88]. Even though ECC groups are either 32 bits
or 64 bits in granularity, using ECC for memory protection has to be at cache-line granularity,
because accesses to main memory use this granularity.
The advantage of using ECC protection over using page protection is that the former is at cache
line granularity, whereas the latter is at page granularity. Therefore, ECC protection can signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of false sharing and padding space. The experiments compared these
two approaches quantitatively, and the results show that ECC protection can reduce the amount of
memory waste used for memory monitoring by up to 74 times (see Section 3.6).
These advantages of ECC protection are also exploited by some fine-grained distributed shared
memory systems, such as Blizzard [SFL+94]. Different from those works, SafeMem leverages
ECC protection for software debugging instead of implementing cache coherence operations.
Therefore, SafeMem has different design trade-offs. In addition, they used special ECC mem-
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ory controllers, whereas SafeMem uses a standard off-the-shelf ECC memory controller, which
has much more limited functionality available to software. For example, most commercial ECC
memory controllers do not allow software to directly access the ECC code. Moreover, unlike page
protection faults, operating systems do not deliver the ECC-error interrupt to user-level programs.
Therefore, it is the first step to address all these challenges before SafeMem uses ECC for moni-
toring memory accesses to watched locations.
I modify the Linux operating system to provide three new system calls: (1) WatchMemory(address,
size), which registers a memory region starting from address to be monitored by SafeMem. The
memory region and its size need to be cache line aligned. (2) DisableWatchMemory(address),
which removes monitoring to the specified memory region. (3) RegisterECCFaultHandler(function),
which registers a user-level ECC fault handler. When an ECC fault occurs, the fault is delivered to
this user-level handler.
SafeMem only needs to detect the first access to each monitored location because: (1) For
memory corruption detection, the first access to a monitored location is a bug. SafeMem then
simply pauses program execution to allow programmers to attach an interactive debugger, such
as gdb, to check the program state and analyze the bug. (2) For memory leak detection, the first
access to a monitored location indicates a false positive. Then this location no longer needs to be
monitored. Therefore, in both cases, the user-level ECC fault handler of SafeMem can disable the
monitoring for the faulted lines using DisableWatchMemory() system call.
Design Issues
Data Scrambling Since most commercial ECC memory controllers do not allow software to
directly modify an ECC code, SafeMem uses a special trick to “scramble” the ECC code of a
watched ECC-group. When WatchMemory is called, SafeMem first disables the ECC functional-
ity, and writes the scrambled data into this ECC-group. It then flushes the data from cache into
memory. Since ECC is disabled, the ECC code for this line remains the same, i.e., the old code.
Finally, SafeMem enables ECC. Figure 3.2 shows the process of this trick. During the disable-
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Figure 3.2: Implementation of WatchMemory
enable period, SafeMem locks the memory bus to avoid any other background memory accesses,
such as those made by other processors or DMAs, so that other memory locations are not affected
by this WatchMemory operation. After this operation, the first access to this location triggers an
ECC fault because of the mismatch between the old ECC code and the scrambled data.
The data is not scrambled randomly. Instead, SafeMem uses a special scrambling scheme to
ensure two properties: (1) The scrambled data should trigger a multi-bit ECC fault instead of a
single-bit error, as most ECC memory can automatically correct single bit errors without reporting
to the operating system. (2) The scrambled data should have a unique signature so that it can be
easily differentiated from a real hardware ECC error. In the prototype implementation, SafeMem
flips 3 fixed bits of the original data stored in a watched line.
In addition, SafeMem stores the original data in a private memory region of SafeMem in order
to differentiate an access fault from a real hardware memory error. With the original data, the
SafeMem ECC fault handler can recompute the “scrambled” value and compare against the current
value stored in memory. If they do not match, it is a real hardware ECC error. Otherwise, it is an
access fault caused by an access to this watched location.
Differentiate Hardware Errors from Access Faults The main functionality of ECC memory
is to detect memory hardware errors, which does not interfere with SafeMem for two reasons.
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First, as mentioned earlier, SafeMem scrambles data in a special way. When an ECC fault occurs,
SafeMem first checks whether the line is monitored; if so, SafeMem checks the data to see whether
it matches the scrambling signature. If yes, it is an access fault, otherwise, it is a hardware error.
Second, the data stored in monitored regions is not useful because monitored regions are either
padded ends or leaked buffers. Therefore, even if the data is modified because of a real hardware
error, it is not critical to the program’s execution. Moreover, the original data in monitored regions
is saved in SafeMem’s private memory.
Dealing with ECC Memory Scrubbing When the memory controller enables scrubbing, mem-
ory is scanned periodically to check and correct hardware errors. Therefore, special care needs to
be taken in order to avoid undesired ECC faults introduced by memory scrubbing. Since most ECC
memory controllers allow the OS to dynamically enable/disable scrubbing, SafeMem solves this
problem by coordinating with ECC memory controllers in the following way: during scrubbing,
SafeMem temporally un-monitors all the watched regions and blocks the monitored program until
scrubbing finishes. Since scrubbing is infrequently performed and only during idle periods, this
will not significantly affect performance. However, a better alternative would be to scrub and un-
monitor the memory at page granularity, which would require changes to ECC memory controllers
to signal the OS before each page scrubbing.
Dealing with Cache Effects To avoid the cache filtering effect, the WatchMemory operation
flushes the corresponding cache line from the processor caches so that subsequent accesses to this
line must access memory and therefore trigger the corresponding ECC fault. This technique also
ensures that a write instruction to a watched line is also monitored (even though writes to memory
do not trigger ECC checks). This is because a write to data that is not currently in cache must first
load the data from memory to cache, and thereby triggers an ECC fault. After the first access is
detected, the line can remain in the processor cache without being flushed because SafeMem only
needs to detect the first access to a watched line.
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Dealing with Page Swapping Since ECC protection is associated with physical memory, it can
be affected by page swapping which changes the virtual-to-physical page mapping. A simple way
to address this problem is to pin monitored pages: a page is pinned when any memory region inside
is monitored, and is unpinned when it has no monitored memory regions. However, this method
limits the total amount of monitored memory. To solve this problem, a better solution would be
to modify the OS to un-monitor all associated memory regions when a page is swapped out, and
re-monitor those regions when this page is swapped in. For simplicity, I implement the first method
in SafeMem.
Discussion
Unfortunately, ECC has several limitations that cannot be overcome by simply using software
tricks. Addressing these limitations requires hardware changes. For example, even though ECC
protection is much finer grained than page protection, it is still larger than desired. In SafeMem,
each dynamic buffer requires padding space of two cache lines. In addition, each dynamic buffer
size needs to be cache-line aligned to avoid false sharing, which also wastes memory space. If
ECC protection could be done at word granularity, such as in the Mondrian Memory Protection
(MMP) [WCA02], the amount of memory waste could be further reduced. Unfortunately, Mon-
drian Memory Protection still does not exist in real hardware yet.
Some aspects of the current ECC library in SafeMem are device-specific. The reason is that
most ECC memory controllers export a narrow, limited interface to OS. Since this study provides
a strong motivation to utilize ECC for purposes other than hardware memory error detection and
correction, we hope that the ECC-protection interface can be generalized to be more software-
friendly, just like page protection. In other words, the interface should include the following two
features: (1) An ECC memory controller allows the OS to directly modify the ECC code associated
with any data. This feature is not only useful for applications like SafeMem, but also allows
software to dynamically fix some transient memory errors without going to panic mode. (2) An
ECC memory controller can deliver precise interrupts of ECC faults to the OS so that the OS
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can catch exactly the faulted instruction. Even though SafeMem does not need this feature for
bug detection, this feature would allow SafeMem to enhance its functionality, such as providing
programmers with precise information regarding the occurred bugs. With the above two features,
SafeMem could be designed with a better hardware-software layered architecture.
3.3 Detecting Memory Leaks
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Figure 3.3: Stability of maximal lifetime (MOG means Memory Object Group).
Not all memory leaks affect software reliability and availability. Trivial memory leaks (leaks
that only happen several times) result only in memory waste and a slight execution slowdown due
to increased paging. In contrast, continuous memory leaks (non-stop leaking) can cause programs
to run out of virtual memory and eventually crash. Crashes are especially catastrophic for long-
running server programs, such as web servers, because service unavailability is directly related
to loss of business. Therefore, continuous leaks are often exploited by malicious users to launch
denial of service attacks.
This chapter focuses on continuous leaks because they make software vulnerable. The detec-
tion method in SafeMem first analyzes the run-time dynamic memory usage behavior of a program,
then uses the learned behavior to detect outliers, and finally exploits ECC-protection to prune false
positives.
For the convenience of description, the following terminology is used throughout this chapter:
• Memory Object: a memory block allocated via memory allocation calls such as malloc,
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realloc, calloc, etc.
• Live Memory Object: a memory object that is not yet deallocated.
• Lifetime of Memory Object: the period from the allocation of a memory object to its deallo-
cation.
• Memory Object Group: a group of memory objects. In this chapter, I use a tuple (size, callChain)
to divide memory objects into various groups, where size is the object’s size, and callChain
is the call-stack signature1 when the object is allocated. Even though it is possible to use
other grouping methods, such as program-specific types, the experiments show that the
grouping mechanism in SafeMem works well and does not require any semantic information
from programs.
3.3.1 Characteristics and Classification of Continuous Memory Leaks
There are two main types of continuous memory leaks for a memory object group, and each type
has different characteristics. The first type, called always leak (ALeak), refers to leaks that always
happen. In other words, the program does not free a group of memory objects in all possible
execution paths. As a result, the number of memory objects in this group grows rapidly, and each
object has an infinite lifetime. Detecting this type of memory leaks is relatively easy since it has
simple characteristics.
The second type, called sometimes leak (SLeak), refers to leaks that sometimes happen. In
other words, in some execution paths, the program deallocates the allocated memory object, but in
the other paths, the program does not free the allocated memory object. Therefore, some memory
objects have finite lifetime whereas other objects in the same group have infinite lifetime. The
number of leaked memory objects grows slowly, but it can still lead to memory resource exhaustion
1 The call-stack signature is calculated by individually applying the exclusive-OR and rotate functions to the return
addresses of the most recent four functions in the current stack.
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after a long period of time, resulting in program crashes. The second type is much harder to detect
since the leak happens only in some execution paths.
Fortunately, based on the memory usage behavior analysis using several server programs, I
found that most dynamic memory objects conform to some expected lifetime. More specifically,
the maximal lifetime of memory objects that belong to the same group usually remains stable after
some warm-up period. Therefore, if SafeMem can dynamically capture the maximal lifetime for
each object group, it can detect outliers—memory objects whose lifetime significantly exceeds the
expected maximal lifetime of the corresponding object group.
Time here means the CPU time of the monitored program, which excludes time used by other
running programs and time waiting for I/Os. Therefore, for server programs, a long idle period
between two consecutive client requests would not affect our detection mechanism.
This observation is validated through statistical analysis using three server programs. To mea-
sure the stability of maximal lifetime for a memory object group, this chapter introduces a metric
called WarmUpTime, which denotes how long it takes for this group’s maximal lifetime to become
stable. For a given memory object group, after the WarmUpTime, objects that belong to this group
never live longer than this maximal lifetime.
Figure 3.3 shows the stability of maximal lifetime for three server programs: ypserv, proftpd,
and squid, which are later used in the experiments to evaluate SafeMem. When collecting statistics,
I use normal inputs so the memory leak bugs do not occur. Each curve on Figure 3.3 plots the
cumulative distribution of memory object groups whose WarmUpTime is smaller than a given
value. For example, a point (t, p) on the curve indicates that p% of the memory object groups in
this program have reached the stable maximal lifetime after running for t seconds. Each memory
object group is labeled by a tuple (size, callChain), described in the previous subsection.
As shown in Figure 3.3, for all three programs, all memory object groups reach their stable
maximal lifetime quickly in the very beginning of the program execution. I have also run the
programs much longer, but the results remain the same. This validates our observation that the
expected maximal lifetime remains stable after some short warm-up periods. Therefore, it can be
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used to detect potential memory leaks by dynamically monitoring each memory object’s lifetime
against the expected maximal lifetime associated with the corresponding object group.
3.3.2 Detection Process
Based on the above observation, SafeMem detects these two types of continuous memory leaks
on-the-fly during production runs. The detection process includes three steps: (1) Dynamically
analyze the memory usage behavior of the monitored program; (2) Detect potential memory leaks
based on observed usage characteristics; (3) Use ECC protection to prune false positives.
Each of the three steps adds only a small overhead because step 1 and step 2 are performed
periodically and only at memory allocation or deallocation time instead of every memory access,
and step 3 is performed only for those rare memory leak suspects. The first access to a suspect
disables ECC monitoring for this memory object.
Step1: Memory Usage Behavior Collection
For each memory object group, SafeMem dynamically collects its allocation/deallocation behavior.
More specifically, SafeMem records two types of information: (1) lifetime information and (2)
memory usage information. The lifetime information includes the current maximal lifetime and
how long the maximal lifetime has been stable (stableTime). Once again, time here is measured
using the CPU time.
The memory usage information includes the number of current live objects, the last allocation
time, and the total memory space currently occupied by this memory object group. For each live
memory object, it also records its allocation time. All live objects within the same group are linked
together using a double-linked list.
At each memory allocation, the information associated with the corresponding memory object
group is updated. More specifically, a new live object is added to this memory object group, and
the number of current live objects is incremented by one. The last allocation time and the total
memory space currently occupied by this memory object group are also updated accordingly.
32
Similarly, the information is also updated at each memory deallocation. First, the lifetime of
the deallocated object is calculated by subtracting the current time by its allocation time. If the
lifetime is smaller than or within some tolerable range (based on a pre-defined threshold) from the
maximal lifetime associated with the corresponding object group, the maximal lifetime remains
unchanged, and its stableTime is incremented by the elapsed CPU processing time from the last
update. Otherwise, the maximal life time is updated to be this object’s lifetime and the stableTime
is reset to zero. Finally, other information, such as the number of current live objects and the total
memory space currently occupied by this memory object group, is also updated.
This step is implemented by wrapping the memory allocation/deallocation functions such as
malloc(), calloc(), realloc(), free(), etc. For programs that use their own memory allocators, Safe-
Mem needs to wrap their allocation and free functions.
Step2: Outlier Detection
The detection techniques are different for different types of memory leak. For each memory object
group, it first checks whether this group has ever called deallocation before. If so, it follows the
detection procedure for SLeaks (sometimes-leak). Otherwise, it continues the process of ALeak
(always-leak) detection.
To detect ALeaks, SafeMem monitors the memory usage behavior. It first checks whether the
number of live objects of each object group exceeds some given threshold. If so, it then checks
whether the memory usage by this group is continuously growing. This is done by checking the last
allocation time associated with this group. If the last allocation time is long time ago (compared
to the current time), the memory usage is not dynamically growing. This is unlikely to be memory
leaks. Instead, it might be the case that the program allocates many objects at initialization time and
these objects are used throughout the entire execution. However, if the last allocation time is very
recent, it indicates that the memory usage is still growing. Therefore, this group of memory objects
are leak suspects, which should be monitored using ECC protection for false positive pruning.
To detect SLeaks, SafeMem monitors the lifetime of each live object. An object is singled
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out as a suspect to be monitored using ECC protection if two conditions hold: (1) this object has
been alive for more than two times its expected maximal lifetime, and (2) the maximal lifetime
for the corresponding object group has been relatively stable for a period of time (longer than a
given threshold). If condition 2 is not true, no outliers will be singled out because the detection
confidence is very low in such cases. Because all live memory objects of the same group are linked
in the order of their allocation time, SafeMem only needs to check the top few oldest memory
objects’ lifetimes to detect potential SLeaks.
The detection process is triggered after a warm-up period, and is periodically performed only at
memory allocation/deallocation time. More specifically, at each memory allocation/deallocation,
if the elapsed time from the last check is greater than a pre-defined parameter, called the checking-
period, the detection process is performed. Therefore, this step has a very small overhead.
It is safe to perform the detection process only at memory allocation/deallocation time. If the
program has not performed any allocation/deallocation for a long time, there is no need to trigger
the detection process because the memory usage is not actively growing. Therefore, even if some
memory objects have already been leaked, it will not cause the program to crash since the memory
usage has stopped growing. As mentioned before, our study focuses on detecting continuous
memory leaks that can affect system reliability and availability.
Step3: False Positive Pruning Using ECC Protection
When an object is marked as a suspect during Step 2, it is monitored using ECC protection to
prune false positives from real leaks. This is based on the observation that if a suspect is accessed
again, it is unlikely to be a memory leak. If it has never been accessed for a threshold of time, it is
reported as a memory leak.
The pruning procedure works as follows. Each suspect is monitored by calling WatchMemory.
The first access to this suspect will trigger the ECC protection handler which then removes this
object from the suspect list and turns off the ECC monitoring for this object. If this suspect is
an SLeak suspect, this object’s allocation time is reset to the current time to catch possible future
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leaks (an object can become a suspect again if it continues to live longer than the expected maximal
lifetime). The maximal lifetime associated with this object group is then updated to be the current
living time of this suspect to avoid other similar false positives.
The pruning process does not impose significant overhead since it is only performed on rare
suspects. In addition, only the first access to a suspect needs to pay the extra overhead of triggering
and executing the ECC fault handler.
3.4 Detecting Memory Corruptions
Memory corruption can be caused by many reasons, among which buffer overflow and accesses
to freed memory are two of the most common. Buffer overflow is a particularly important type of
memory corruption because it is often exploited by viruses to attach and execute malicious code.
Therefore, SafeMem focuses on detecting buffer overflows and accesses to freed memory, both of
which are also the major types of bugs detected by Purify.
To detect buffer overflow, SafeMem pads the two ends of each buffer and then uses ECC
protection to guard these paddings; any accesses to the padding are reported as buffer overflow
bugs. The current implementation of SafeMem uses a cache line as the padding unit. It could
easily use longer paddings, but the experiments on applications with buffer overflow bugs show
that the current setting is good enough. To reduce false sharing, each memory buffer is cache line
aligned. When a buffer is deallocated, the ECC monitoring of its paddings is disabled.
To detect accesses to freed memory, SafeMem uses ECC protection to watch all freed memory
buffers. An access to such a buffer will trigger the ECC fault handler which reports this access as a
bug. When a freed memory buffer is reallocated, ECC monitoring for this buffer will be disabled.
Similar to buffer overflow detection, each memory buffer and its size need to be cache line-aligned
to avoid false sharing.
The overhead to detect both types of memory corruption is relatively small because it only
needs an extra system call at the memory allocation/deallocation time. Since most programs do
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not have very frequent allocation/deallocation, the overhead imposed by SafeMem is small, as
shown in our experimental results (See Section 3.6).
ECC protection can also be used to detect other types of bugs, even though the current imple-
mentation of SafeMem does not support them yet. For example, accesses to uninitialized objects
could also be detected using ECC protection. After a memory buffer is allocated, it can be pro-
tected using ECC protection. The first write to this buffer would disable the ECC protection, but
the first read would be detected and reported as a bug.
3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Platform
The experiments are conducted on a real system with a 2.4 GHz Pentium processor, an ECC mem-
ory controller with the Intel E7500 chipset [Int], and 1 GByte of memory. The operating system
extensions (the three new system calls) are added into Linux kernel 2.4.20. SafeMem is imple-
mented as a shared library and can be dynamically preloaded in advance to avoid recompilation of
the tested programs (unless the programs use their own memory allocators, in which case we need
to do some simple changes to intercept their memory allocation/deallocation calls).
The evaluation compares the time overhead of SafeMem to Purify [HJ92b], a state-of-the-art
dynamic bug detection tool. Purify can detect memory corruption and memory leak bugs. More
specifically, in order to find memory-access errors, Purify maintains two bits for each byte of
memory to track its status: allocated or freed, and initialized or uninitialized. Purify checks each
memory operation against its status and reports illegal accesses. As for memory leaks, at some
point during program execution or when the tested program exits, Purify applies an algorithm
similar to the conventional mark-and-sweep algorithm [HJ92b], which utilizes conservative pointer
tracking to scan the whole heap. Performing such an expensive operation adds large overhead and
also significantly perturbs the program’s response time, especially for server programs. Therefore,
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these tools are always used for in-house debugging instead of during production runs.
We evaluate seven different real-world, buggy applications shown on the Table 3.1, from com-
plicated network server daemons, such as squid and proftpd, to simple common utilities, e.g., gzip.
These tested applications are divided into two groups: one containing memory leaks, and the other
containing memory corruption bugs.
Based on these applications, we have conducted two sets of experiments. The first set evaluates
the functionality of SafeMem in detecting bugs, and the second set compares the overhead of
SafeMem to Purify’s using bug-free runs of the tested applications (with normal inputs). We also
evaluate the benefits of ECC protection in reducing memory waste and pruning false positives.
Bugs Application LOC Description
ypserv1 11,200 a NIS server
Memory proftpd 68,700 a ftp server
Leak squid1 95,000 a Web proxy cache server
ypserv2 9,700 a NIS server
Memory gzip 8,900 a compression utility
Corruption tar 34,000 an archiving utility
squid2 93,000 a Web proxy cache server
Table 3.1: Tested applications (LOC means lines of code). squid1 and squid2 are different ver-
sions of squid, but one contains memory leaks and the other contains a memory corruption bug.
Similarly, ypserv1 and ypserv2 are different versions of ypserv, but one contains ALeaks and the
other contains SLeaks.
Even though several studies [NMW02] have directly compared their tools with Purify for de-
tecting only one type of bug, memory corruption, we do note that Purify can check for other types
of bugs, such as accesses to uninitialized variables, which are not detected by SafeMem. Unfor-
tunately, the current version of Purify does not provide options to allow disabling these checks
to make the comparison fair. However, based on our experience and understanding of Purify’s
techniques, disabling these checks would not reduce its overhead significantly. After all, Purify
needs to monitor every memory access no matter whether it is for detecting memory corruption or
for detecting accesses to uninitialized variables. Moreover, this does not have much impact on the
interpretation of our results since SafeMem has a substantial overhead reduction over Purify.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Microbenchmark Results
First, I conduct some microbenchmarks to measure the cost of the ECC monitoring system calls.
Table 3.2 shows the cost for the WatchMemory() and DisableWatchMemory() system calls on our
machine. The costs for these two calls are relative cheap (less than 2 microseconds), comparable
to the page protection call mprotect() provided by the standard Linux system. Ours are slightly
higher than mprotect because our calls need to pin (unpin) the page in the virtual memory system.
3.6.2 Overall Results
Table 3.3 shows the overall results of SafeMem with seven buggy applications. First, SafeMem can
detect all the tested bugs (both memory leaks and memory corruption). This shows that SafeMem
is effective in achieving its expected functionality.
I also compare SafeMem’s overhead with Purify’s. For fair comparison, SafeMem enables
both memory leak detection and memory corruption detection for all experiments, even though
each application has only one type of bug. To avoid disturbance by the bugs, I use normal inputs
when measuring overheads so the bugs do not occur and program can run correctly to completion.
As shown in Table 3.3 (column “ML+MC”), SafeMem adds only 1.6%-14.4% overhead for
all tested applications, a factor of 114-1660 times smaller than Purify’s overhead (4.8X - 49.8X).
For example, for gzip SafeMem adds only 3.0% overhead, whereas Purify slows down this ap-
plication by a factor of 49.8. This is because SafeMem does not need to monitor each memory
Calls Time(microseconds)
ECC WatchMemory 2.0
Protection DisableWatchMemory 1.5
Page Protection mprotect 1.02
Table 3.2: Time for the ECC system calls
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Bugs Apps Bug SafeMem Overhead(%) of Detecting Purify Ov- Reduction
Detected? Only ML Only MC ML + MC erhead (%) by SafeMem
ypserv1 YES 1.0 4.2 6.0 941 157X
Memory proftpd YES 0.9 2.6 3.6 2093 581X
Leak squid1 YES 5.6 7.8 13.7 1782 130X
(ML) ypserv2 YES 0.7 10.5 11.5 1308 114X
Memory gzip YES 0.3 2.2 3.0 4979 1660X
Corruption tar YES 0.7 1.0 1.6 475 297X
(MC) squid2 YES 6.1 8.1 14.4 1720 119X
Table 3.3: Time overhead (%) comparison between SafeMem and Purify
access. Instead, it relies on ECC protection and intelligent memory usage behavior analysis to
detect memory corruption and memory leaks. In contrast, Purify needs to intercept every memory
access in order to detect memory corruption, and needs to do a mark-and-sweep over the entire
memory space in order to detect memory leaks. The small overhead indicates that SafeMem can
be used to detect memory leaks and memory corruption during production runs.
I further measure SafeMem’s overhead for detecting only memory leaks and detecting only
memory corruption, respectively. The memory leak detection overhead comes mainly from the
information collection and analysis, whereas the memory corruption overhead comes mainly from
the ECC monitoring and un-monitoring. Table 3.3 also shows that overhead caused by memory
corruption detection is more than that caused by memory leak detection. This is because memory
corruption detection needs to enable ECC monitoring at each buffer allocation and disable ECC
monitoring at each deallocation. Memory leak detection, however, only enables monitoring for
the suspected memory objects, which usually is many fewer than the total number of allocated
memory objects.
3.6.3 Benefits of ECC Protection
Table 3.4 shows the benefit of ECC protection over page protection in reducing memory waste for
padding and alignment. As shown on this table, ECC-protection adds only 0.084%-334% of total
memory overhead (not necessarily used at the same time) for the tested applications, whereas page-
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Bugs Application Memory Overhead(%) Reduction
ECC- Page-Protection by ECC
ypserv1 57 3900 68X
Memory proftpd 35 2357 67X
Leak squid1 26.4 1950 74X
ypserv2 3.6 233 64X
Memory gzip 0.084 6.06 72X
Corruption tar 334 23178 69X
squid2 28.7 2120 73X
Table 3.4: Space overhead (%) comparison between ECC- and page-protection approaches. The
overhead is calculated over each applications’ actual memory usage throughout the whole execu-
tion.
Application False Positives
Before Pruning After Pruning
ypserv1 7 0
proftpd 9 0
squid1 13 1
ypserv2 2 0
Table 3.5: False memory leaks reported before and after using ECC-protection. No false positives
for memory corruption detection by SafeMem.
protection has 6.06%-231.78X of memory space overhead! In other words, ECC-protection can
reduce the memory waste of page-protection by a factor of 64-74! This shows that ECC protection
is a better mechanism to use for detecting memory leaks and memory corruption.
3.6.4 Effects of ECC-Protection in False Pruning for Memory Leaks
Table 3.5 reports the effects of ECC-protection in false pruning for memory leaks. The results show
that this pruning mechanism is very effective: it is able to reduce the number of false positives
from 2-13 to 0-1. For example, for squid1, without this pruning scheme, SafeMem would have
introduced 13 false positives instead of 1 false positive, which is much harder for programmers.
SafeMem does not have any false positives in memory corruption detection because any accesses
to padding areas or freed memory buffers are true memory corruption.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter presents an approach called SafeMem that makes a novel use of ECC memory for
detecting memory leaks and memory corruption, two major forms of software bugs that contribute
significantly toward software vulnerabilities. SafeMem does not require any new hardware exten-
sions and can work with existing systems with ECC memory, which is commonly used in modern
systems. Moreover, this chapter also present a new method that uses intelligent memory usage
behavior analysis to detect memory leaks.
This chapter evaluated SafeMem using seven real-world buggy applications and the result in-
dicates that SafeMem can be used for building a first-level defense for detecting memory leaks
and memory corruption during production runs. The results show that SafeMem can detect all
tested bugs with only 1.6%-14.4% overhead, 2-3 orders of magnitude smaller than the commonly
used commercial tool, Purify. Moreover, the results also show that ECC protection can reduce
the amount of wasted memory by a factor of 64-74 compared to page protection. Finally, ECC
protection is also very effective in pruning false positives for memory leak detection.
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Chapter 4
Second-Level Defense: Detecting Bug
Exploits
4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Motivation
As discussed in Chapter 1, during production runs not all triggered software bugs can be caught
in the first-level defense. Those escaped bugs such as stack buffer overflow and double free may
be exploited by malicious users for launching security attacks. The question is how we should
address them to control the system damage that may be caused by those attacks. This chapter
proposed a low-overhead, software-only information flow tracking system, called LIFT, to build
the second-level defense. LIFT minimizes the runtime overhead by exploiting dynamic binary
translation and optimizations for detecting various types of security attacks without requiring any
hardware changes.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, several recent work [CCC+05, NS05, SLZD04] demonstrated that
information flow tracking is a promising and effective technique to effectively detect many system-
compromising security attacks, even for unknown types of exploits and software vulnerabilities.
Generally this technique tags (labels) the input data from unsafe channels such as network connec-
tions as “unsafe” data, propagates the data tags through the computation (any data derived from
unsafe data are also tagged as unsafe), and detects unexpected usages of the unsafe data that switch
the program control to the unsafe data as exemplified in the stack smashing attack. In addition to
the generality of attack detection, information flow tracking can also trace back to the input data
that exploits the vulnerability to generate attack input signatures. This feature has been demon-
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strated to be very useful for effectively building a preventive network defense [CCC+05, NS05].
Table 4.1 shows an example to demonstrate the information flow tracking process. Initially, a
is received from the network, so it is unsafe. The second statement makes the information of a
flowing to b. When the program jumps to the location pointed by c, the system will raise an alarm
if c is unsafe.
Target Program Information Flow Tracking
receive (&a); Tag(a) = 1 // unsafe as it is received from network
b=a; Tag(b) = Tag(a)
... ...
jmp c; if (Tag(c) == 1), raise alert!
Table 4.1: An example of information flow tracking
So far information flow tracking has been implemented in three different ways. The first ap-
proach is to track information flow at compile time for programs written in special type-safe pro-
gramming languages [Den76, DD77, HR98, Mye99, ML00]. While this approach can enforce the
information flow security policies for programs without runtime overhead, it only works for pro-
grams that are written in the specific program languages and is therefore inapplicable to a large
number of legacy programs written in type-unsafe languages such as C/C++. More importantly,
due to lack of accurate runtime information, most tools in this category are designed for detecting
sensitive information leaking instead of security attacks due to lack of accurate runtime informa-
tion. For example, it is hard for them to detect attacks that alter the target of indirect branches,
which can only be resolved at runtime.
The second approach is to track information flow and detect malicious exploits at runtime via
either source code or binary code instrumentation. Source-code instrumentation-based informa-
tion flow tracking, as done in Xu et al’s work [XBS06], has lower overhead than the alternative,
binary-code instrumentation-based implementation, but it cannot track information flow in third-
party library code and thereby will miss security exploits involving these libraries as reported in
US-CERT [US-06]. Additionally, it requires programmers to provide a summary for each library
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function to allow the information flow through library calls, which can be an error-prone and te-
dious task as many library calls are fairly complex, making many side-effects in addition to simple
return values. In contrast, implementing information flow tracking via binary instrumentation as
Vigilante [CCC+05] does can track information accurately even in libraries, but suffers from a
major overhead problem: it can slow down the program execution by more than 40 times [NS05],
too large to be used during production runs against security attacks.
The third approach of information flow tracking is to support it in hardware [SLZD04, VBC+04].
For example, the recent work RIFLE [VBC+04] and Suh et al’s work [SLZD04] proposed new
hardware extensions to track information flow for each instruction. While this approach is effec-
tive in detecting security attacks with low overhead, it requires non-trivial hardware extensions.
Therefore, it is quite expensive and is not applicable to existing systems.
4.1.2 Highlight of LIFT
This chapter proposes a low overhead, software-only, comprehensive and practical information
flow tracking system, called LIFT. LIFT minimizes run-time overhead by exploiting aggressive
dynamic binary instrumentation and optimizations for detecting various types of security attacks
without requiring any hardware changes. Dynamic binary instrumentation and optimizations
leverage accurate runtime information and enable more aggressive optimizations than static ap-
proaches at compile time. For example, at runtime we can eliminate many unnecessary dynamic
information flow tracking for execution periods when it can be sure that there is no unsafe data
involved in the computation.
More specifically, LIFT employs three runtime binary optimizations to minimize the overhead
associated with information flow tracking for detecting general security attacks. The first opti-
mization, referred as Fast Path (FP), eliminates unnecessary dynamic information flow tracking.
This is based on the observation that, for most applications, the majority of computation involves
safe data, for which it is unnecessary to track information flow. Therefore, by dynamically and
efficiently performing a simple check before an execution region (e.g. basic block), LIFT can see
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whether involved data is safe or not; if it is, a fast binary version without any information flow
tracking is executed; otherwise, the execution follows a slow version with detailed information
flow tracking. By dynamically switching between fast and slow versions on demand, LIFT can
effectively avoid unnecessary information tracking.
The second optimization, Merged Check(MC), further reduces the information flow checking
overhead by coalescing data safety checks from multiple consecutive basic blocks into one. This
optimization exploits both spatial locality and temporal locality of memory references because
multiple safety checks for both nearby data and the same data are combined into one. It not
only reduces the number of checks but also avoids bit operations because the safety of one byte
is indicated by only one bit in the corresponding data tag. This optimization is applied to both
consecutive basic blocks but also dynamic instruction traces (i.e. dynamically-formed frequently
executed code regions).
The last optimization, Fast Switch (FS), reduces the overhead and number of context switches 1
between the target program and the information flow tracking code by using alternative cheaper
instructions and status register liveness analysis, respectively. To avoid interference with the target
program, most binary instrumentation frameworks such as PIN [LCM+05] and StarDBT [BWWA06]
usually require saving/restoring some program execution context, including the status register and
the runtime stack pointers, of the target program before and after executing the instrumented code
(the reason will be discussed in detailed in Section 4.3.3). This context switch, even though much
smaller than OS-level context switches, can still introduce large runtime overhead. LIFT min-
imizes this overhead by cleverly selecting cheaper instructions and performing register liveness
analysis.
I have implemented LIFT based on a dynamic binary translator called StarDBT [BWWA06]
on Windows. The real-system experiments with two real-world server applications, one client
application, and eighteen attack benchmarks [WK03] show that LIFT can effectively detect various
types of security attacks. LIFT also incurs very low overhead, only 6.2% for server applications,
1Note that the context switch here is not the OS-level context switch between different threads or kernel-user mode.
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and 3.6 times on average for seven SPEC INT2000 applications. The dynamic optimizations in
LIFT are very Effective in reducing the overhead by a factor of 5-12 times.
Compared to previous approaches, LIFT provides several unique advantages:
• Low-overhead. Compared to other software-only binary-based information flow tracking
system that slows down program execution by more than 40 times, LIFT incurs significantly
less overhead, only 6.2% for server applications, and 3.6 times on average for seven SPEC
INT2000 applications, which indicate that LIFT is practical to use during production runs
for detecting security attacks.
• Not requiring any hardware extensions. LIFT is a software-only approach based on dy-
namic binary instrumentation and optimization. Unlike previous hardware-based approaches
[VBC+04, SLZD04] that requires non-trivial hardware extensions, LIFT requires no hard-
ware extension. Therefore, it can be used immediately in existing systems.
• Not requiring source code. Unlike source-level information flow tracking [XBS06], LIFT
works with binary code and thereby can work with commercial software whose source code
is unavailable. In addition and most importantly, it can performs accurate information flow
tracking inside third-party library code and, consequently, can detect security vulnerabilities
and exploits that occur inside these libraries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the design and implemen-
tation of the basic information flow tracking system (LIFT-basic), followed by the three optimiza-
tion techniques described in Section 4.3. Then Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 evaluate LIFT, followed
by summary in Section 4.6.
4.2 LIFT Basic Design and Implementation
LIFT tracks information flow at runtime via dynamic binary translation and optimization to detect
general security attacks. Similar to other information flow tracking systems [SLZD04, NS05,
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CCC+05], LIFT dynamically instruments the binary of the target program to perform two tasks:
(1) tracking information flow, and (2) detecting security exploits that switch the program control
flow to unsafe data.
This section describes the basic design and implementation including the basic dynamic binary
instrumentation framework, tag management, information flow tracking, exploit detection, an ex-
ample of information flow tracking for instructions, and protection of tag space and LIFT code.
The three dynamic optimizations for minimizing runtime overhead will be described in the next
section.
4.2.1 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework
I build LIFT on top of a dynamic binary translator called StarDBT [BWWA06] developed by
Intel. StarDBT automatically loads the original program code into memory and initializes the
program execution context at program startup time. Like other dynamic binary instrumentation
and translation frameworks [BDB00, SBB+03, LCM+05], StarDBT manages a code cache to store
the translated code so that the original code is translated once and executed multiple times in order
to amortize the translation cost. In addition, StarDBT collects profiling information to form hot
traces of frequently executed code. More details about the basic dynamic binary translation and
instrumentation framework can be found in [BWWA06].
At run time, LIFT uses StarDBT to instrument the translated code with instructions that per-
form information flow tracking and attack detection. Besides StarDBT, LIFT can also be built
on top of other dynamic binary instrumentation tools or translators such as Dynamo [BDB00],
PIN [LCM+05], etc.
4.2.2 Tag Management
Similar to prior work [SLZD04], LIFT associates a one-bit tag (0 for “safe” data and 1 for “unsafe”
data) for each byte of data in memory or general data registers. It can be easily extended to
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a multiple-bit tag for each byte as needed. For example, users may want to use different tags
to express their trustiness for data from different sources such as network data, disk data, and
other data. Using multiple-bit tags can also reduce some overhead by avoiding bit operations in
information flow tracking as demonstrated in prior work [XBS06], but it significantly increases
the space overhead for keeping tags and also increases processor cache pollution. Therefore, the
current prototype of LIFT uses one-bit tags.
LIFT stores the tags for memory data in a special memory region, called the tag space, via
a one-to-one direct mapping between a tag bit and a memory byte in the target program’s virtual
address space. Such direct mapping makes it straightforward and fast (with only one memory
access and 2-3 arithmetic instructions) to get the tag value for a given memory location.
The current tag space incurs 12.5% space overhead. If the virtual memory space is limited,
we can minimize the tag space using compression as memory data nearby each other usually have
similar tag values: either all zeros or all ones. So we may keep only one value for the entire
memory region (e.g. a page). Although this scheme saves memory space, it has extra runtime
overhead for tag look-ups. Since the current prototype of LIFT is based on 64 bits architectures,
where virtual memory space is seldom limited, I only use the flat tag space management without
any compression.
LIFT stores the tags for general registers in a dedicated extra register to minimize overhead.
Since register accesses are very frequent in program execution, the register tags are also accessed
frequently. Therefore, for efficient register tag accesses, LIFT uses an extra 64-bit register to store
the tags for all registers used in the target program.
At the beginning, all tags are cleared to zero. Based on the application-specific tagging policy,
certain data (e.g. data read from the network or standard input) are tagged with 1 as “unsafe”. As
the program continues, other data may also be tagged with 1 via information flow. An unsafe data
can become safe if its value is reassigned from some safe data. All constants are safe data.
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4.2.3 Information Flow Tracking
As program executes, LIFT propagates the tag information from one data to another. It does this by
dynamically instrumenting instructions with information flow track according to its type. For data
movement-based instructions such as MOV, PUSH, POP, etc, the tag value of the source operand
is propagated to the tag of the destination (e.g, if the source operand is unsafe, the destination also
becomes unsafe). For arithmetic instructions, such as ADD, OR, etc, the corresponding tag values
of the two source operands are OR-ed and the result is propagated to the tag of the destination
operand since the information of the destination operand comes from both source operands. For
instructions that involve only one operand, such as INC, etc, the tag of the operand does not change
since the information of the operand flows to itself. Similar to many previous work [XBS06,
CCC+05, SLZD04, VBC+04], LIFT tracks information flows based on data dependencies but not
control dependencies.
There are a few special instructions whose information flow tracking in LIFT does not follow
the above general rules. For example, in x86 architecture, the instruction “XOR eax, eax” ini-
tializes the “eax” register to 0, therefore the tag value of “eax” should be reset to 0 (“safe” data).
However, the general rule for this instruction keeps the tag of “eax” unchanged. To handle such
cases, LIFT identifies these special instructions such as “XOR reg, reg” and “SUB reg, reg”, and
clear the tags of the corresponding registers or memory data.
In the baseline case (without any optimization described in the next section), the information
flow tracking code is instrumented once at runtime and executed multiple times. The reason for
instrumenting before instead of after an instruction in the original program is that execution of the
instruction may change the operand address and thus make tag propagation more difficult.
4.2.4 Exploit Detection
In addition to information flow tracking, certain instructions are also instrumented to detect mali-
cious exploits, i.e. improper usages of unsafe data that violate user-specified security policies. For
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example, “unsafe” data cannot be used as a return address or the destination of an indirect jump
instruction, etc.
By default, similar to previous work [CCC+05, SLZD04, NS05], LIFT detects any general
security attacks, regardless of the underlying security vulnerabilities, which use “unsafe” data for
jump targets, return addresses, function pointers, or function pointer offsets. This allows us to
detect a wide variety of security attacks since the last step of most security attacks requires directly
or indirectly changing the program control flow to some unsafe data by altering the return address,
function pointers, or general jump targets.
4.2.5 An Example of Information Flow Tracking for LIFT-basic
Figure 4.1 shows an example of information flow tracking instructions for three instructions (with
bold font) from a target program. For different instruction type, the number of instrumented in-
structions for information flow tracking varies. For example, the first instruction moves a constant
to a register, whose information flow tracking takes eight instructions, while the second and third
instructions from the target program each requires twenty instructions for information flow track-
ing or exploit detection respectively.
We use the second instruction “ADD ebx, [ecx]” from the target program as an example to see
how the information flows. Instructions 1-5 do context switch, including switching to a different
stack and saving the conditional flag register. Instructions 6-16 get the tag of the memory data
“[ecx]”. Instructions 17-18 propagate the tag of source operand in memory to the tag of destination
operand in the register. The last two instructions restore the context.
4.2.6 Protection of Tag Space and LIFT Code.
In addition to overhead, another important concern is that LIFT code or the tag space can be
corrupted by some program errors or carefully-crafted malicious inputs. Therefore, it is necessary
to protect them. To protect the LIFT code against corruption, I use page protection to make the
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MOV ebx, 0x0400h ADD ebx, [ecx] JMP ebx
MOV r10, gs:[30h]
MOV r10, [r10+1488h]
MOV [r10−8], rsp
LEA rsp, [r10−8]
PUSHFQ
AND RegTag, 0xffffff0fh
POPFQ
POP rsp
MOV r10, gs:[30h]
MOV r10, [r10+1488h]
MOV [r10−8], rsp
LEA rsp, [r10−8]
PUSHFQ
XOR r11, r11
LEA r11d, [ecx]
MOV r10d, r11d
SHR r11d, 3
ADD r11, Tag_Space_Base
MOV r13, [r11]
AND r10d, 0x07h 
XCHG r10d, ecx
SHR r13, cl
XCHG r10d, ecx
AND r13, 0x0fh
SHL r13, 0x04h
OR RegTag, r13
POPFQ
POP rsp
MOV r10, gs:[30h]
MOV r10, [r10+1488h]
MOV [r10−8], rsp
LEA rsp, [r10−8]
PUSHFQ
XOR r11, r11
MOV r11d, ebx
MOV r10d, r11d
SHR r11d, 3
ADD r11, Tag_Space_Base
MOV r13, [r11]
AND r10d, 0x07h 
XCHG r10d, ecx
SHR r13, cl
XCHG r10d, ecx
AND r13, 0x0fh
TEST r13, 0x0Fh
JNZ report_intrusion
POPFQ
POP rsp
Figure 4.1: Information flow tracking for three different instructions in LIFT-basic. The instruc-
tion with bold font is an original instruction from the target program. The non-bold instructions
instrumented before the bold instruction perform information flow tracking.
memory pages that store the LIFT code read-only. Thus, any attempt to modify the LIFT code
causes a page fault.
To protect the tag space, LIFT uses a mechanism similar to prior work by Xu et al. [XBS06].
That is, it turns off the access permission of those pages that store the tag values of the tag space
itself (note that the tag space is also a part of the virtual memory space, so there is also a tag bit for
each byte of the tag space). Thus any instruction in the original program or some hijacked code
accesses the tag space will result in some information flow tracking, which needs to access the
corresponding tags and thereby triggers a protection fault.
4.3 LIFT Binary Optimizations
Last section described the baseline system of LIFT. Since it does not have any optimizations,
similar to previous software-only runtime information flow tracking systems [NS05, CCC+05], it
incurs large runtime overhead (up to 47 times as shown in our experiments). To minimize the over-
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head associated with information flow tracking so that it is practical to use during production runs
against security attacks, on top of the baseline system LIFT employs three binary optimizations
including (1) Fast Path (FP) that eliminates unnecessary information flow tracking, (2) Merged
Check (MC) that merges multiple tag checks into one, and (3) Fast Switch (FS) that reduces the
overhead incurred for switching between instrumented code and the original program.
All the above optimizations do not sacrifice the capability of detecting security attacks because
they are all conservative: never eliminate any necessary tag propagations. In addition, they are all
performed at the binary level so they work for software and libraries whose source code is unavail-
able. Even though it is possible to implement the third optimization, FS, via static instrumentation,
the FP and MC optimizations benefit from the trace linking (also referred as hot traces) mechanism
(each trace combines multiple basic blocks dynamically) available only in dynamic instrumenta-
tion frameworks. The following three subsections describe the three optimizations, respectively.
4.3.1 Fast Path (FP) Optimization
The Fast-Path (FP) optimization is based on the observation that, for most applications, majority
of tag propagations are zero-to-zero, i.e., from safe data sources to a safe destination. To validate
the above hypothesis, I collect some statistics of a running Apache Web server. In the experiments,
all data received from the network are tagged as one (unsafe). At runtime, LIFT collects statistics
on the distribution of different types of tag propagations: (1) S → S: both the sources and the
destination are safe; (2) S → U : a safe data overwrites an unsafe data in the destination; (3)
U → S: the instruction propagates an unsafe data to a memory location that stores safe data. and
(4) U → U : the instruction propagates an unsafe data to a memory location that stores unsafe data.
As shown on Figure 4.2, majority of tag propagation belongs to the first type: (1) S → S. This
is because, in most applications, only data received from network are tagged as unsafe initially, and
most other data that do not have data dependency on these data will remain safe, for at least many
execution periods (even though it may not be always safe for the entire execution). Therefore, any
computation among these safe data corresponds to zero-to-zero tag propagation.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of four groups of tag propagation in Apache
The above observation provides a good dynamic optimization opportunity to eliminate un-
necessary tag propagation. Specifically, before a code segment (either a basic block or a hot
trace [BWWA06, LCM+05])), we can insert some checks to see if all its live-in and live-out regis-
ters or memory data are safe or not. If so, then there is no need to do any information flow tracking
inside this code segment. Checking the safety of all live-ins at the very beginning of a code seg-
ment is very intuitive as they are the source operands. LIFT also needs to check the safety of all
live-out locations at the very beginning of a code segment because they may currently store unsafe
data, and may be overwritten by some safe data inside this code segment, in which case it is nec-
essary to do information flow tracking inside this code segment. There is no need to check other
data because they are either not used in this code segment, or they are dead at the very beginning
or end of this code segment.
The Fast-Path (FP) optimization is based on the above idea. It inserts information checks before
entering a code segment. If all live-ins and live-outs are safe, it runs the fast binary version, referred
as the check version, without any information flow tracking. Otherwise, it runs the slow version,
referred as the track version, which performs information flow tracking. By dynamically switching
between fast and slow versions, LIFT can effectively avoid unnecessary information flow tracking
for dynamic code segments (dynamic instances of code segments) that do not involve any unsafe
data. Since it always performs tag checks first to decide whether to run the track version, it does
not affect the capability of detecting security attacks.
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REG_TAGS & BitVectorMask == 0?
(2 instructions)
Tag<[eax]>==0?
(14 instructions)
yes
. . .
Code segment entry
yes
  MOV edx, [eax]
  ADD edx, ecx
  . . .
  MOV [eax+4], edx
. . .
. . .
  Tag<edx> = Tag<[eax]>
  (21 instructions)
  MOV [eax+4], edx
  MOV edx, [eax]
  ADD edx, ecx
  Tag<edx> = Tag<ecx>|Tag<edx>
  (12 instructions)
  Tag<[eax+4]> = Tag<edx>
  (24 instructions)
Next code segment
check version track version
. . .
no
no
. . .
Figure 4.3: An example of the FP and MC optimizations. A code segment here can be a basic
block or a hot trace, which is formed dynamically at runtime and can consist of multiple basic
blocks.
LIFT can easily check the tags for all the registers used in a program region. Essentially, it as-
sociates with each code segment a bit vector, called BitVectorMask , which records the live-in and
live-out registers whose tags need to be checked. As demonstrated in Figure 4.3, at the beginning
of a code segment, a check is inserted by performing an AND operation on the BitVectorMask and
REG TAGS , which records the tags for all general data registers. If the result is zero, it follows
the check version, otherwise jumps to the track version.
Unfortunately, to know the memory live-ins and live-outs at the beginning of a code segment
are much harder because some addresses may not be known at the beginning of the code seg-
ment. Therefore, as demonstrated on Figure 4.3, to handle memory data tags, LIFT postpones
the information check of a memory location until its address is known, usually right before this
memory instruction. If its tag is zero, it continues the check version; otherwise, it jumps to the
corresponding instruction in the track version.
The granularity of a code segment can be either a basic block, or a hot trace which is formed
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dynamically at runtime and can consist of multiple basic blocks. At run time, if multiple basic
blocks are frequently accessed one after another, the dynamic binary instrumentation engine will
link them together by replacing indirect or conditional jump into a move and a direct jump. Then
all these multiple basic blocks form a hot trace which is then stored in the trace cache. Obviously,
it is better to perform the optimization at the trace granularity than at the basic granularity because
the former performs only one check for registers in the very beginning of a trace and also provide
opportunity for the next optimization, MC, to merge more memory tag checks into one.
The FP optimization can be further optimized by dynamic adaptation based on different behav-
ior of code segments. For some code segments, the program may always execute the slow version.
For example, those functions that receive and process network data always access “unsafe” data.
In such cases, we can directly switch the program control flow to the slow version without wasting
time to do the first few checks in the fast version.
4.3.2 Merged Check (MC) Optimization
Even after the FP optimization, many information checks are redundant or semi-redundant, which
provides an opportunity for the second optimization: Merged Check(MC) optimization. MC re-
duces the number of information checks by combining multiple tag checks into one. Similar to the
FP optimization, it is more beneficial to perform the MC optimization at the trace granularity.
To combine multiple checks into one, MC exploits both temporal locality and spatial locality
of memory references commonly exhibited in many applications. Temporal locality says that a
recently accessed data is likely to be accessed again in the near future, whereas spatial locality
means that after an access to a location, memory locations that are nearby are also likely to be
accessed in the near future. To exploit the temporal locality characteristic, if a trace has multiple
memory references to the same location, MC combines the tag checks and performs it only once
right before the first memory reference. Secondly, MC exploits the spatial locality of memory
references and merge multiple tag checks of nearby memory locations into one check.
To perform the optimization, MC needs to find ahead of time what memory accesses are to
55
the same or nearby locations. It does this by performing memory reference analysis and then
clustering the memory references into different groups. More specifically, MC first scans all the
instructions in a trace and constructs a data dependency graph for each memory reference. The
dependency graph for a memory reference consists of the version numbers of the registers and
offsets for computing the address of this memory reference. It increments the version number of a
register every time the register is defined by an instruction explicitly or implicitly. For example, the
stack operations may implicitly modify the stack pointer register. From these dependency graphs,
MC can easily cluster the nearby/same memory references into a group. For example, if multiple
references depend on the same version of the same register and the same offset, they are to the
same memory location. And if their offsets differ by a small number, they are to nearby memory
locations. At the end, MC inserts one tag check before the first instruction of each group.
4.3.3 Fast Switch (FS) Optimization
In most general instrumentation frameworks such as PIN [LCM+05] and StarDBT [BWWA06],
when the program execution switches between the original binary code and the instrumented code,
it requires saving and restoring the context, including the condition register and the runtime stack
registers (switching to a separate stack). The reason for saving the condition register before switch-
ing to the instrumented code is straightforward, the instrumented code may change the value of the
condition register. The reason for using a separate stack for the instrumented code, i.e. the informa-
tion flow tracking/checking code, is for avoiding modifying the stack in case of register overflow
when executing the instrumented code. More explanation about this context switch requirement
and process can be found in previous work [BWWA06, LCM+05].
This context switch, even though much smaller than OS-level context switches, can still in-
troduce large runtime overhead, especially the instrumentation is inserted at many locations as in
our case for information flow tracking. LIFT minimizes the above context switch overhead in the
original StarDBT binary instrumentation framework by cleverly selecting cheaper instructions and
performing liveness analysis.
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First, the FS optimization of LIFT reduces the overhead associated with each context switch.
Similar to other binary instrumentation tool, the original StarDBT saves/restores the context of the
original code to/from the stack using simple but expensive pushfq/popfq instructions in the x86
architecture. To make each context switch cheaper, LIFT uses two cheaper instructions lahf /sahf
to save/restore the condition register to other free registers. By eliminating pushfq/popfq , it also
avoids the need of a separate stack for executing the information flow tracking/checking.
Second, with the FS optimization, LIFT performs condition register liveness analysis to elim-
inate those unnecessary condition register save and restore operations. In the x86 architecture,
an eflags register saves the program conditional flags. LIFT’s liveness analysis tracks the define
and use of eflags bits for each instruction within a program region of the original code. In many
cases, the eflag register value is dead at the beginning of many program regions (e.g. instruction
traces). Therefore, it is unnecessary to save it before switching to the instrumented code, i.e. the
information tracking or checking code.
4.4 Evaluation Methodology
Test Platform The experiments are conducted on real machines. The evaluated applications runs
on an EM64T machine with two 64-bit Xeon processors of 3.0GHz, 512KB L2 cache, and 1GB
memory, running the Windows XP 64-bit version as the OS. For the network applications, we also
use a second machine to act as the other party of the evaluated application. This machine has two
Xeon processors of 2.2 GHz, 512KB L2 cache, and 512MB memory, runs the Linux 2.6.9 kernel
and is connected to the EM64T machine via 100Mbps Ethernet network. I implement LIFT on
StarDBT [BWWA06], a dynamic binary translator developed by Intel.
Applications We evaluate the functionality and performance of LIFT with a variety of appli-
cations, including three real-world network applications (two servers and one client) and two
benchmark suits. The network applications include Apache Web server [Apa06], Savant Web
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Applications Version Exploits App Description
Apache 1.3.24 overwrite the function pointer a web server
Savant 3.1 overwrite the return address a web server
Putty 0.53 overwrite the return address a telnet program
Attack Benchmarks 2003 18 different types of exploits a buffer overflow testbed
Table 4.2: Applications and security exploits
server [sav06] and Putty [Tat06]. The first benchmark suite consists of eighteen different attack
benchmarks developed by John Wilander [WK03] and covers a variety of different security ex-
ploits. We ported the attack benchmarks from Linux version to Windows version.
To evaluate LIFT’s capability in detecting general types of security attacks, we use three net-
work applications as well as the eighteen attack benchmarks, as listed on Table 4.2. To play the
real-world attacks for the three network applications, we leverage the Metasploit [met06] frame-
work to send the malicious inputs. The experiments cover a variety of different exploits. For
example, the exploit in Savant Web server overwrites the return address in the stack. The attack
benchmarks cover eighteen types of exploiting methods, including different overwrite techniques
(direct or indirect), different buffer locations (stack or heap/BSS/data), and different attack targets
(return address, base pointer, function pointer, or longjmp buffers).
For real-world network applications, we use Windows Layered Service Provider [HOB99]
technique to intercept network data and tag received data as “unsafe”. This tagger works in the net-
work layer and requires no source code of target programs. Since the attack benchmarks simulate
network input, we have to modify the testbed to tag the simulated network input data as “unsafe”.
To evaluate LIFT’s overhead and the effects of our optimizations on latency and throughput,
we use seven SPEC INT2000 benchmark and the Apache Web server. For Apache, we label all
data received from network as “unsafe” and measure the throughput. For SPEC benchmarks, we
measure the performance for two configurations of initial tagging scheme: one is tagging all the
input data from disk files as “unsafe” for simulate network data; the other is tagging all the input
data from disk files as “safe” to measure the performance upper bounds.
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Exploits Targets Detected #/Exploits #
(Exploits #) StackGuard Stack Shield ProPolice LibSafe and Libverify LIFT
Return Address (3) 3/3 3/3 2/3 1/3 3/3
Base Pointer (3) 2/3 3/3 2/3 1/3 3/3
Function Pointer (6) 0/6 0/6 3/6 1/6 6/6
Longjmp buffer (6) 0/6 0/6 3/6 1/6 6/6
Total (18) 5/18 6/18 10/18 4/18 18/18
Table 4.3: Results of LIFT for attack benchmarks
4.5 Experimental Results
4.5.1 Security Attack Detection
Table 4.3 shows the effectiveness of LIFT in detecting general security attacks. We compare LIFT’s
results with those reported by prior work [WK03] that evaluated five existing tools, including
StackGuard [CPM+98], Stack Shield [sta06], ProPolice [Eto06], and LibSafe+LibVerify [BTS99,
BST00], using the same eighteen attack benchmarks. We classify the eighteen types of attacks
into four groups based on their exploiting targets, including return address, base pointer, function
pointer, and longjmp buffer. Those targets can be either in the stack or heap/BBS/data regions.
Overall, LIFT detects all the eighteen exploits of various types because it is oblivious to the
specific exploit method such as smashing a return address, overwriting a function pointer, etc. All
these exploit methods need to switch the program control to some “unsafe” data in order to hijack
the program, so they are all detected by LIFT. In contrast, the other five tools shown in Table 4.3
can only detect some of the exploits since they are designed for certain types of exploits and cannot
deal with other unknown exploits. For example, StackGuard and Stack Shield can only detect those
attacks that try to smash a return address and a base pointer.
The evaluation with three real-world network applications, including two popular Web servers
(Apache and Savant) and one network client (Putty), shows that LIFT can also detect various types
of attacks in real-world scenario. For example, the vulnerabilities in Savant Web server and Putty
are exploited to overwrite the return address and switch the program control to some “unsafe” code.
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Configurations Throughput Response Time
Results (MBps) Overhead (%) Results (millisecond) Overhead (%)
Native 8.06 0 1.1 0
StarDBT 7.79 3.4 1.5 36.4
LIFT-basic 6.40 20.6 5.1 363.6
LIFT-FS 6.97 13.6 3.5 220.0
LIFT-FS-FP 7.49 7.1 2.3 109.1
LIFT 7.56 6.2 2.1 90.9
Table 4.4: The throughput and response time of Apache running on native machine and with
different optimizations techniques applied. “Native” means that the Apache runs directly on the
machine, “StarDBT” refers to our base line binary translation framework without any LIFT-related
instrumentation. “LIFT-basic” is the basic LIFT system without any optimizations. “LIFT-FS” is
LIFT-basic with the Fast-Switch optimization. “LIFT-FS-FP” is LIFT-basic with Fast-Switch and
Fast-Path optimizations, and “LIFT” is LIFT-basic with all three optimizations. The requested file
sizes uniformly distributed among 4KB, 8KB, 16KB, to 512KB.
LIFT successfully reports these two attacks. For Apache, a long request overwrites the whole stack
and triggers an exception when attempting to write beyond the stack boundary. The default signal
handler in a system library fetches a function pointer from the corrupted stack and switch the
program control via that “unsafe” function pointer. In the experiments, we observed LIFT marks
all the data in the corrupted stack as “unsafe” and theoretically it can catch this attack once the
program control is switched via the “unsafe” function pointer. However, LIFT does not report this
attack since the current version of StarDBT does not provide accurate exception handling. We are
improving StarDBT on this issue.
LIFT raises no false alarms in all the experiments. We run LIFT normally with network appli-
cations such as Apache Web server and Putty and other small utilities such as Notepad without any
false alarms reported. In addition, we tag all the input data from disk files for the tested SPEC-INT
programs as “unsafe”, LIFT still runs through all the tests without raising any false alarms.
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4.5.2 Performance Results
Overhead with Apache
Table 4.4 shows that LIFT incurs low runtime overhead for Apache. With all three optimizations,
LIFT incurs only 6.2% for the throughput of Apache, close to 3.4% incurred by StarDBT. This
is because LIFT aggressively applies dynamic optimization to eliminate unnecessary information
flow tracking and provide a fast switch between the instrumented code and the original code. For
example, the Fast Switch (FS) optimization reduce the overhead for the throughput from 20.6%
to 13.6% and the overhead for the response time from 363.6% to 220%. The Fast Path (FP)
optimization further improves the performance, bringing down the overhead for the throughput to
7.1% and the overhead for the response time to 109.1%.
The overhead of LIFT comes from several sources. The first is the StarDBT binary translation
framework which incurs 3.4% overhead. The second source comes from the dynamic translating,
instrumenting, optimizing and maintaining the binary code. The third source, the most significant
one, is the overhead for executing the instrumented code to perform tag checks, tag propagation,
and attack detection.
Overhead with SPEC INT Benchmarks
Figure 4.4 shows that LIFT incurs low runtime overhead for the seven SPEC programs. Benefited
from the three optimizations, LIFT incurs only 1.7-7.9 times overhead and an average of 3.6 times
overhead when all the input data are tagged “unsafe”, much smaller than the large overhead (40
times) slowdowns reported for a previous binary instrumentation-based information flow tracking
tool [NS05]. This is because LIFT aggressively applies dynamic optimization to eliminate un-
necessary information flow tracking and provide a fast switch between instrumented code and the
original code.
Figure 4.4 also shows that the three optimizations effectively reduce the overhead incurred
in the basic LIFT system. For example, without any optimization, LIFT-basic slows down the
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Figure 4.4: Overall Results. Comparison of normalized execution time. “Native”, “StarDBT”,
“LIFT-basic”, “LIFT-FS”, “LIFT-FS-FP”, and “LIFT” have the same meaning as in Table 4.4.
Initially, the input data from disk files are tagged safe or unsafe in the two figures respectively.
program execution by 12.0-46.5 times and on average 26.6 times, which are effectively reduced by
the three dynamic optimizations to an average of 3.6 times overhead, a factor of 7.4 times reduction
in overhead!
With input data initially tagged as “safe” or “unsafe”, LIFT-basic shows no difference in terms
of runtime overhead since the tag is propagated regardless whether it is “safe” or not. In contrast,
LIFT, with all optimizations, does incur different overheads. For example, with all input data
tagged as “safe” for vpr, LIFT incurs only 0.6 times overhead, and with all input data tagged as
“unsafe” for vpr, it incurs 1.7 times overhead. This is because, if all input data are tagged “safe”,
LIFT always run the check version, which is much faster than the track version. Note here, that
even with all input data tagged “unsafe”, LIFT does not necessarily always run the track version
since there still exist many computation that do not involve any “unsafe” data (because usually
information flow tracking systems do not track control dependencies [CCC+05, NS05, VBC+04,
SLZD04]).
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Figure 4.5: The execution number of the check version and the track version for basic blocks in
Apache and SPEC. For SPEC, all the input data are tagged as “unsafe”. The total execution number
is the sum of the execution number of both the check version and the track version.
Effects of Optimizations
Figure 4.4 shows that the three optimizations can effectively reduce the runtime overhead caused
by LIFT-basic. Now let us examine the effect of each individual optimization. First, we apply
the FS optimization to LIFT-basic since LIFT-basic has very frequent and heavy context switches.
With all input data tagged as unsafe, the FS optimization can reduce the overhead significantly by
a factor of 4.4 times. This is because it reduces both the cost of each context switching by using
cheaper instructions and the number of context switches by using eflag liveness analysis.
The FP optimization reduces the overhead incurred by LIFT-FS for all applications to different
extent. For example, with all input data tagged as “unsafe” initially, OPT-FP further reduces the
overhead of LIFT-FS for crafty from 7.7 times to 3.1 times, while reducing the overhead of LIFT-
FS for mcf from 2.9 times to 2.4 times. This is because the amount of overhead reduction depends
on the percentage of check versions are executed for each application. As shown in Figure 4.5,
with all input data are tagged as “unsafe”, a significant amount (98.9%) of the execution for crafty
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Figure 4.6: The execution number of memory checks for SPEC. All the input data are tagged
as “unsafe”. “w/o-MC” means run LIFT-FS-FP without the MC optimization applied. “w/-MC”
refers to LIFT with all three optimizations including MC.
is in the check version, which results in the large reduction of the overhead incurred by LIFT-FS,
while mcf only has 7.2% of the execution in the check version.
MC further reduces the overhead of LIFT after the first two optimizations, FS and FP, for all
cases with different percentage. For example, the overhead of Apache’s throughput decreased from
7.1% to 6.2% after applying MC. For SPEC applications the overhead reduction varies. For exam-
ple, MC reduce the overhead for crafty from 3.1 times to 2.4 times, while it has no visible effects
on the overhead for twolf (reducing from 7.97 times to 7.96 times). This is because the overhead
reduction depends on how many executed memory checks are reduced and how many percentage
the program execute the fast version since only the fast version contains the memory checks. Fig-
ure 4.6 shows the normalized executed memory checks number with and without applying MC
with all the input data tagged as “unsafe”. We can see that MC reduced 46% of executed memory
checks for crafty, while it only reduced 4% of executed memory checks for twolf.
64
4.6 Summary
In summary, LIFT is a low-overhead, cheap (no hardware extension), comprehensive (works with
libraries), and practical information flow tracking system for detecting general security attacks.
It is suitable for building a second-level defense during production runs. It minimizes runtime
overhead by exploiting dynamic binary instrumentation and optimization including the Fast-Path,
Merged-Check and Fast-Switch optimizations.
The real-system experiments with three real-world network applications, including two Web
servers and one client application, and eighteen attack benchmarks show that LIFT can effectively
detect all tested 21 security attacks of various types, much more than five of the previous tools that
can only detect at most ten attacks as shown in prior study [WK03]. More importantly, compared
to other software-only binary-based information flow tracking system that slows down program
execution by more than 40 times [NS05], LIFT incurs significantly less overhead, only 6.2% for
server applications, and 3.6 times on average for seven SPEC INT2000 applications. The three
optimizations also effectively reduce the overhead by a factor of 5-12 times.
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Chapter 5
Third-Level Defense: Surviving Software
Failures
5.1 Overview
5.1.1 Motivation
After having detected software bugs in the first level of defense and exploitation of software bugs in
the second level of defense as demonstrated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively, the program
can be simply shut down to prevent further damage to the system. However, many applications,
especially critical ones such as process control or on-line transaction monitoring, require high
availability [Gra86]. This chapter proposes a safe technique, called Rx, to build the third level of
defense via quickly recovering from many types of software failures caused by common software
bugs, both deterministic and non-deterministic.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, much research has been conducted in surviving software failures.
This dissertation classifies them into four categories. The first category encompasses various fla-
vors of rebooting (restarting) techniques, including whole program restart [Gra86, SC91], micro-
rebooting of partial system components [CCF+02, CKF+04], and software rejuvenation [HKKF95,
GPTT97, BS98]. Since many of these techniques were originally designed to handle hardware fail-
ures, most of them are ill-suited for surviving software failures. For example, they cannot deal with
deterministic software bugs, a major cause of software failures [CC00], because these bugs will
still occur even after rebooting. Another major limitation of these methods is service unavailability
while restarting, which can take up to several seconds [VDA+98]. For servers that buffer signifi-
cant amount of state in main memory (e.g. data buffer caches), it requires a long period to warm up
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to full service capacity [BBG+89, VDB+98]. Micro-rebooting [CKF+04] addresses this problem
to some extent by only rebooting the failed components. However, it requires legacy software to
be reconstructed in a loosely-coupled fashion.
The second category includes general checkpointing and recovery. The most straightforward
method in this category is to checkpoint, rollback upon failures, and then re-execute either on the
same machine [EAWJ02, RLT78] or on a different machine designated as the “backup server” (ei-
ther active or passive) [Gra86, Bar81, BBG+89, BS96, VDB+98, ACZ00, ZCL99]. Similar to the
whole program restart approach, these techniques were also proposed to deal with hardware fail-
ures, and therefore suffer from the same limitations in addressing software failures. In particular,
they also cannot deal with failures caused by deterministic bugs. Progressive retry [WHF93] is an
interesting improvement over these approaches. It reorders messages to increase the degree of non-
determinism. While this work proposes a promising direction, it limits the technique to message
reordering. As a result, it cannot handle bugs unrelated to message order. For example, if a server
receives a malicious request that exploits a buffer overflow bug, simply reordering messages will
not solve the problem. The most aggressive approaches in the checkpointing/recovery category in-
clude recovery blocks [Ran75] and n-version programming [AC77, Avi85, RCL01], both of which
rely on different implementation versions upon failures. These approaches may be able to survive
deterministic bugs under the assumption that different versions fail independently. But they are
too expensive to be adopted by software companies because they double the software development
costs and efforts.
The third category comprises application-specific recovery mechanisms, such as the multi-
process model (MPM), exception handling, etc. Some multi-processed applications, such as the
old version of the Apache HTTP Server and the CVS server, spawn a new process for each client
connection and therefore can simply kill a failed process and start a new one to handle a failed
request. While simple and capable of surviving certain software failures, this technique has several
limitations. First, if the bug is deterministic, the new process will most likely fail again at the
same place given the same request (e.g. a malicious request). Second, if a shared data structure is
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corrupted, simply killing the failed process and restarting a new one will not restore the shared data
to a consistent state, therefore potentially causing subsequent failures in other processes. Other
application-specific recovery mechanisms require software to be failure-aware, which adversely
affects programming difficulty and code readability.
The fourth category includes several recent non-conventional proposals such as failure-oblivious
computing [RCD+04] and the reactive immune system [SLBK05]. Failure-oblivious computing
proposes to deal with buffer overflows by providing artificial values for out-of-bound reads, while
the reactive immune system returns a speculative error code for functions that suffer software fail-
ures (e.g. crashes). While these approaches are fascinating and may work for certain types of
applications or certain types of bugs, they are unsafe to use for correctness-critical applications
(e.g. on-line banking systems) because they “speculate” on programmers’ intentions, which can
lead to program misbehavior. The problem becomes even more severe and harder to detect if the
speculative “fix” introduces a silent error that does not manifest itself immediately. In addition,
such problems, if they occur, are very hard for programmers to diagnose since the application’s
execution has been forcefully perturbed by those speculative “fixes”.
Besides the above individual limitations, existing work provides insufficient feedback to devel-
opers for debugging. For example, the information provided to developers may include only a core
dump, several recent checkpoints, and an event log for deterministic replay of a few seconds of
recent execution. To save programmers’ debugging effort, it is desirable if the run-time system can
provide information regarding the bug type, under what conditions the bug is triggered, and how
it can be avoided. Such diagnostic information can guide programmers during their debugging
process and thereby enhance their efficiency.
5.1.2 Highlights of Rx
This dissertation proposes a safe (not speculatively “fixing” the bug) technique, called Rx, to build
the third level of defense via quickly recovering from many types of software failures caused by
common software defects, both deterministic and non-deterministic. It requires few to no changes
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to applications’ source code, and provides diagnostic information for postmortem bug analysis.
The idea is to rollback the program to a recent checkpoint when a bug is detected, dynamically
change the execution environment based on the failure symptoms, and then re-execute the buggy
code region in the new environment. If the re-execution successfully pass through the problematic
period, the new environmental changes are disabled to avoid imposing time and space overheads.
The idea of Rx is inspired from real life. When a person suffers from an allergy, the most
common treatment is to remove the allergens from her/his living environment. For example, if
patients are allergic to milk, they should remove diary products from the diet. If patients are
allergic to pollen, they may install air filters to remove pollen from the air. Additionally, when
removing a candidate allergen from the environment successfully treats the symptoms, it allows
diagnosis of the cause of the symptoms. Obviously, such treatment cannot and also should not start
before patients shows allergic symptoms since changing living environment requires special effort
and may also be unhealthy.
In software, many bugs resemble allergies. That is, their manifestation can be avoided by
changing the execution environment. According to a previous study by Chandra and Chen [CC00],
around 56% of faults in Apache HTTP server depend on execution environment 1. Therefore, by
removing the “allergen” from the execution environment, it is possible to avoid such bugs. For
example, a memory corruption bug may disappear if the memory allocator delays the recycling of
recently freed buffers or allocates buffers non-consecutively in isolated locations. A buffer overrun
may not manifest itself if the memory allocator pads the ends of every buffer with extra space.
Uninitialized reads may be avoided if every newly allocated buffer is all filled with zeros. Data
races can be avoided by changing timing related events such as thread-scheduling, asynchronous
events, etc. Bugs that are exploited by malicious users can be avoided by dropping such requests
during program re-execution. Even though dropping requests may make a few users (hopefully
the malicious ones) unhappy, they do not introduce incorrect behavior to program execution as
1Note that the definition of execution environment in this dissertation is different from theirs. Here, the standard
library calls, such as malloc, and system calls are also part of execution environment.
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the failure-oblivious approaches do. Furthermore, given a spectrum of possible environmental
changes, the least intrusive changes can be tried first, reserving the more extreme one as a last
resort for when all other changes have failed. Finally, the specific environmental change which
cures the problem gives diagnostic information as to what the bug is.
Similar to an allergy, it is difficult and expensive to apply these execution environmental
changes from the very beginning of the program execution because we do not know what bugs
might occur later. For example, zero-filling newly allocated buffers imposes time overhead. There-
fore, Rx should lazily apply environmental changes only when needed.
We have implemented Rx with Linux and evaluated it with four server applications that contain
four real bugs (bugs introduced by the original programmers) and two injected bugs (bugs injected
by us) of various types including buffer overflow, double free, stack overflow, data race, unini-
tialized read and dangling pointer bugs. Compared with previous solutions, Rx has the following
unique advantages:
• Comprehensive: Rx can survive many common software defects. Besides non-deterministic
bugs, Rx can also survive deterministic bugs. The experiments show that Rx can successfully
survive the six bugs listed above. In contrast, the two tested alternatives, a whole program
restart approach and a simple rollback and re-execution without environmental changes, can-
not recover the three servers (Squid, Apache, and CVS) that contain deterministic bugs, and
have only a 40% recovery rate for the server (MySQL) that contains a non-deterministic con-
currency bug. Such results indicate that applying environmental changes during re-execution
is the key reason for Rx’s successful recovery of all tested cases.
• Safe: Rx does not speculatively “fix” bugs at run time. Instead, it prevents bugs from man-
ifesting themselves by changing only the program’s execution environment. Therefore, it
does not introduce uncertainty or misbehavior into a program’s execution, which is usually
very difficult for programmers to diagnose.
• Noninvasive: Rx requires few to no modifications to applications’ source code. Therefore, it
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can be easily applied to legacy software. In our experiments, Rx successfully avoids software
defects in the four tested server applications without modifying any of them.
• Efficient: Because Rx requires no rebooting or warm-up, it significantly reduces system
down time and provides reasonably good performance during recovery. In the experiments,
Rx recovers from software failure within 0.017-0.16 seconds, 21-53 times faster than the
whole program restart approach for all but one case (CVS). Such efficiency enables servers
to provide non-stop services despite software failures caused by common software defects.
Additionally, Rx is quite efficient. The technology imposes little overhead on server through-
put and average response time and also has small space overhead.
• Informative: Rx does not hide software bugs. Instead, bugs are still exposed. Furthermore,
besides the usual bug report package (including core dumps, checkpoints and event logs),
Rx provides programmers with additional diagnostic information for postmortem analysis,
including what conditions triggered the bug and which environmental changes can or cannot
avoid the bug. Based on such information, programmers can more efficiently find the root
cause of the bug. For example, if Rx successfully avoids a bug by padding newly allocated
buffers, the bug is likely to be a buffer overflow. Similarly, if Rx avoids a bug by delaying the
recycling of freed buffers, the bug is likely to be caused by double free or dangling pointers.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the main idea of Rx.
Followed by Rx design in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses issues in design and implementa-
tion. Section 5.5 and Section 5.6 presents the evaluation methodology and results respectively.
Section 5.7 summarize this chapter.
5.2 Main Idea of Rx
The main idea of Rx is to, upon a software failure, rollback the program to a recent checkpoint
and re-execute it in a new environment that has been modified based on the failure symptoms.
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Figure 5.1: Rx: The main idea
If the bug’s “allergen” is removed from the new environment, the bug will not occur during re-
execution, and thus the program will survive this software failure. After the re-execution safely
passes through the problematic code region, the environmental changes are disabled to reduce time
and space overhead imposed by the environmental changes.
Figure 5.1 shows the process by which Rx survives software failures. Rx periodically takes
light-weight checkpoints that are specially designed to survive software failures instead of hard-
ware failures or OS crashes (See Section 5.3.2). When a bug is detected, either by an exception or
by integrated dynamic software bug detection tools called as the Rx sensors, the program is rolled
back to a recent checkpoint. Rx then analyzes the occurring failure based on the failure symptoms
and “experiences” accumulated from previous failures, and determines how to apply environmental
changes to avoid this failure. Finally, the program re-executes from the checkpoint in the modified
environment. This process will repeat by re-executing from different checkpoints and applying
different environmental changes until either the failure does not recur or Rx times out, resorting to
alternate solutions, such as whole-program rebooting [Gra86, SC91]. If the failure does not occur
during re-execution, the environmental changes are disabled to avoid the overhead associated with
these changes.
In Rx idea, the execution environment can include almost everything that is external to the tar-
get application and can affect the execution of the target application. At the lowest level, it includes
the hardware such as processor architectures, devices, etc. At the middle level, it includes the OS
kernel such as scheduling, virtual memory management, device drivers, file systems, network pro-
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Category Environmental Changes Potentially-Avoided Bugs Deterministic?
delayed recycling of freed buffer double free, dangling pointer YES
Memory padding allocated memory blocks dynamic buffer overflow YES
Management allocating memory in an alternate location memory corruption YES
zero-filling newly allocated memory buffers uninitialized read YES
scheduling data race NO
Asynchronous signal delivery data race NO
message reordering data race NO
User-Related dropping user requests bugs related to the dropped request Depends
Table 5.1: Possible environmental changes and their potentially-avoided bugs
tocols, etc. At the highest level, it includes standard libraries, third-party libraries, etc. Such defi-
nition of the execution environment is much broader than the one used in previous work [CC00].
Obviously, the execution environment cannot be arbitrarily modified for re-execution. A useful
re-execution environmental change should satisfy two properties. First, it should be correctness-
preserving, i.e., every step (e.g., instruction, library call and system call) of the program is executed
according to the APIs. For example, in the malloc() library call, we have the flexibility to decide
where buffers should be allocated, but we cannot allocate a smaller buffer than requested. Second, a
useful environmental change should be able to potentially avoid some software bugs. For example,
padding every allocated buffer can prevent some buffer overflow bugs from manifesting during
re-execution.
Table 5.1 lists some environmental changes and the types of bugs that can be potentially
avoided by them. Examples of useful execution environmental changes include, but are not limited
to, the following categories:
(1)Memory management based: Many software bugs are memory related, such as buffer over-
flow, dangling pointers, etc. These bugs may not manifest themselves if memory management is
performed slightly differently. For example, each buffer allocated during re-execution can have
padding added to both ends to prevent some buffer overflows. Delaying the recycling of freed
buffers can reduce the probability for a dangling pointer to cause memory corruption. In addition,
buffers allocated during re-execution can be placed in isolated locations far away from existing
memory buffers to avoid some memory corruption. Furthermore, zero-filling new buffers can
avoid some uninitialized read bugs. Since none of the above changes violate memory allocation
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or deallocation interface specifications, they are safe to apply. Also note that these environmental
changes affect only those memory allocations/deallocations made during re-execution.
(2)Timing based: Most non-deterministic software bugs, such as data races, are related to the
timing of asynchronous events. These bugs will likely disappear under different timing conditions.
Therefore, Rx can forcefully change the timing of these events to avoid these bugs during re-
execution. For example, increasing the length of a scheduling time slot can avoid context switches
during buggy critical sections. This is very useful for those concurrency bugs that have high
probability of occurrences. For example, the data race bug of the MySQL server in the experiments
has a 40% occurrence rate on a uniprocessor machine.
(3)User request based: Since it is infeasible to test every possible user request before releasing
software, many bugs occur due to unexpected user requests. For example, malicious users issue
malformed requests to exploit buffer overflow bugs during stack smashing attacks [CPM+98].
These bugs can be avoided by dropping some users’ requests during re-execution. Of course,
since the user may not be malicious, this method should be used as a last resort after all other
environmental changes fail.
If the failure disappears during a re-execution attempt, the failure symptoms and the effects
of the environmental changes applied are recorded. This speeds up the process of dealing with
future failures that have similar symptoms and code locations. Additionally, Rx provides all such
diagnostic information to programmers together with core dumps and other basic postmortem bug
analysis information. For example, if Rx reports that buffer padding does not avoid the occurring
bug but zero-filling newly allocated buffers does, the programmer knows that the software failure
is more likely to be caused by an uninitialized read instead of a buffer overflow.
After a re-execution attempt successfully passes the problematic program region for a threshold
amount of time, all environmental changes applied during the successful re-execution are disabled
to reduce space and time overheads. These changes are no longer necessary since the program has
safely passed the “allergic seasons”.
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If the failure still occurs during a re-execution attempt, Rx will rollback and re-execute the
program again, either with a different environmental change or from an older checkpoint. For
example, if one change (e.g. padding buffers) cannot avoid the bug during the re-execution, Rx
will rollback the program again and try another change (e.g. zero-filling new buffers) during the
next re-execution. If none of the environmental changes work, Rx will rollback further and repeat
the same process. If the failure still remains after a threshold number of iterations of rollback/re-
execute, Rx will resort to previous solutions, such as whole program restart [Gra86, SC91], or
micro-rebooting [CCF+02, CKF+04] if supported by the application.
Upon a failure, Rx follows several rules to determine the order in which environmental changes
should be applied during the recovery process. First, if a similar failure has been successfully
avoided by Rx before, the environmental change that worked previously will be tried first. If this
does not work, or if no information from previous failures exists, environmental changes with small
overheads (e.g. padding buffers) are tried before those with large overheads (e.g. zero-filling new
buffers). Changes with negative side effects (e.g. dropping requests) are tried last. Changes that
do not conflict, such as padding buffers and changing event timing, can be applied simultaneously.
Although the situation never arose during the experiments, there is still the rare possibility that
a bug still occurs during re-execution but is not detected in time by Rx’s sensors. In this case,
Rx will claim a recovery success while it is not. Addressing this problem requires using more
rigorous on-the-fly software defect checkers as sensors. This is currently a hot research area that
has attracted much attention. In addition, it is also important to note that, unlike in failure oblivious
computing, this problem is caused by the application’s bug instead of Rx’s environmental changes.
The environmental changes just make the bug manifest itself in a different way. Furthermore, since
Rx logs its every action including what environmental changes are applied and what the results are,
programmers can use this information (i.e. some environmental changes make the software crash
much later) to analyze the occurring bug.
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5.3 Rx Design
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Figure 5.2: Rx architecture
Rx is composed of a set of user-level and kernel-level components that monitor and control
the execution environment. The five primary components are seen in Figure 5.2: (1) sensors
for detecting and identifying software failures or software defects at run time, (2) a Checkpoint-
and-Rollback (CR) component for taking checkpoints of the target server application and rolling
back the application to a previous checkpoint upon failure, (3) environment wrappers for changing
execution environments during re-execution, (4) a proxy for making server recovery process trans-
parent to clients, and (5) a control unit for maintaining checkpoints during normal execution, and
devising a recovery strategy once software failures are reported by sensors.
5.3.1 Sensors
Sensors detect software failures by dynamically monitoring applications’ execution. There are two
types of sensors. The first type detects software errors such as assertion failures, access violations,
divide-by-zero exceptions, etc. This type of sensor can be implemented by taking over OS-raised
exceptions. The second type of sensor detects software bugs in the first level of defense or ex-
ploitation of software bugs in the second level of defense as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
before they cause the program to crash. This type of sensors leverage existing low-overhead dy-
namic bug detection or bug exploits detection tools in the first or second level of defense, such as
CCured [CHM+03b], StackGuard [CPM+98], SafeMem [QLZ05], and LIFT, to name a few. In
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the Rx prototype, I have only implemented the first type of sensors. However, I plan to integrate
second type of sensors into Rx.
Sensors notify the control unit upon software failures with information to help identify the
occurring bug for recovery and also for postmortem bug diagnosis. Such information includes
the type of exception (Segmentation fault, Floating Point Exception, Bus Error, Abort, etc.), the
address of the offending instruction, stack signature, etc.
5.3.2 Checkpoint and Rollback
Mechanism
The CR (Checkpoint-and-Rollback) component takes checkpoints of the target server application,
and automatically and transparently rolls back the application to a previous checkpoint upon a
software failure. At a checkpoint, CR stores a snapshot of the application into main memory.
Similar to the fork operation, CR copies application memory in a copy-on-write fashion to min-
imize overhead. By preserving checkpoint states in memory, the overhead associated with slow
disk accesses in most previous checkpointing solutions is avoided. This method is also used in
previous work [CPL97, JZ88, LNP90, WHV+95, LC98, PLP98, SAKZ04]. Performing a rollback
operation is straightforward: simply reinstate the program from the snapshot associated with the
specified checkpoint.
Besides memory states, the CR also needs to take care of other system states such as file states
during checkpointing and rollback to ensure correct re-execution. To handle file states, CR applies
ideas similar to previous work [LC98, SAKZ04] by keeping a copy of each accessed files and
file pointers in the beginning of a checkpoint interval and reinstate it for rollback. To simplify
implementation, Rx can leverage a versioning file system which automatically takes a file version
upon modifications. Similarly, copy-on-write is used to reduce space and time overheads. For
some logs file that users may want the old content not to be overwritten during re-execution, Rx can
easily provide a special interface that allows applications to indicate what files should not be rolled
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back. Other system states such as messages and signals will be described in the next subsection
because they may need to be changed to avoid a software bug recurring during re-execution. More
details about the lightweight checkpointing method can be found in the previous work [SAKZ04],
which uses checkpointing and logging to support deterministic replay for interactive debugging.
In contrast to previous work on rollback and replay, Rx does not require deterministic replay.
On the contrary, Rx purposely introduces nondeterminism into server’s re-execution to avoid the
bug that occurred during the first execution. Therefore, the underlying implementation of Rx
can be simplified because it does not need to remember when an asynchronous event is delivered
to the application in the first execution, how shared memory accesses from multiple threads are
interleaved in a multi-processor machine, etc., as what have done in the previous work [SAKZ04].
The CR also supports multiple checkpoints and rollback to any of these checkpoints in case Rx
needs to roll back further than the most recent checkpoint in order to avoid the occurring software
bug. After rolling back to a checkpoint CPi, all checkpoints which were taken after CPi are
deleted. This ensures that the program does not rollback to a checkpoint which has been rendered
obsolete by the rollback process. During a re-execution attempt, new checkpoints may be taken for
future recovery needs in case this re-execution attempt successfully avoids the occurring software
bug.
Checkpoint Maintenance
A possible concern is that maintaining multiple checkpoints could impose a significant space over-
head. To address this problem, Rx can write old checkpoints to disks on the background when
disks are idle. But rolling back to a checkpoint, which is already stored in disks, is expensive due
to slow disk accesses.
Fortunately, Rx does not need to keep too many checkpoints because it strives to bound the
recovery time to be 2-competitive as the baseline solution: whole program restarting. In other
words, in the worse case, Rx may take twice as much time as the whole program restarting solution
(In reality, in most cases as shown in Section 5.6, Rx recovers much faster than the whole program
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restart). Therefore, if a whole program restart would take T seconds (This number can be measured
by restarting immediately at the first software failure and then be used later), Rx can only repeat
rollback/re-execute process for at most T seconds. As a result, Rx cannot rollback to a checkpoint
which is too far back in the past, which implies that Rx does not need to keep such checkpoints
any more.
More formally, suppose Rx takes checkpoints periodically, let τ1,τ2,· · ·,τn be the timestamps
of the last n checkpoints that have been kept in the reverse chronological order. There are two
schemes to keep those checkpoints: one is to keep only recent checkpoints, and the other is to
keep exponential landmark checkpoints (with β as the exponential factor) as in the Elephant file
system [SFH+99]. In other words, the two schemes satisfy the following equations, respectively.
τi − τi+1 = τi−1 − τi (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
τi − τi+1 = β ∗ (τi−1 − τi) (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
Note that time here refers to application execution time as opposed to elapse time. The latter
can be significantly higher, especially when there are many idle periods.
After each checkpoint, Rx estimates whether it is still useful to keep the oldest checkpoint. If
not, the oldest checkpoint taken at time τn is deleted from the system to save space. The estima-
tion is done by calculating the worst-case recovery time that requires rolling back to this oldest
checkpoint. Suppose after rolling back to a checkpoint, every ith re-execution (1 ≤ i ≤ m) with
different environmental changes incurs the overhead pi. Obviously, some environmental changes
such as buffer padding impose little time overhead, whereas other changes such as zero-filling
buffers incur large overhead. pis can be measured at run time. Therefore the worst-case recovery
time, RTime, that requires to roll back to the oldest checkpoint would be (let τ be the current
timestamp):
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RTime =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(τ − τi)(1 + pj) =
n∑
i=1
(τ − τi)
˙m∑
j=1
(1 + pj)
If RTime is greater than T , the oldest checkpoint taken at time τn is deleted.
5.3.3 Environment Wrappers
The environment wrappers perform environmental changes during re-execution for averting fail-
ures. Some of the wrappers, such as the memory wrappers, are implemented at user level by
intercepting library calls. Others, such as the message wrappers, are implemented in the proxy.
Finally, still others, such as the scheduling wrappers, are implemented in the kernel.
Memory Wrapper The memory wrapper is implemented by intercepting memory-related library
calls such as malloc(), realloc(), calloc(), free(), etc to provide environmental changes. During
the normal execution, the memory wrapper simply invokes the corresponding standard memory
management library calls, which incurs little overhead. During re-execution, the memory wrapper
activates the memory-related environmental changes instructed by the control unit. Note that the
environmental changes only affect the memory allocation/deallocation made during re-execution.
Specifically, the memory wrapper supports four environmental changes:
(1) Delaying free, which delays recycling of any buffers freed during a re-execution attempt to
avoid software bugs such as double free bugs and dangling pointer bugs. A freed buffer is reallo-
cated only when there is no other free memory available or it has been delayed for a threshold of
time (process execution time, not elapsed time). Freed buffers are recycled in the order of the time
when they are freed. This memory allocation policy is not used in the normal mode because it can
increase paging activities.
(2) Padding buffers, which adds two fixed-size paddings to both ends of any memory buffers al-
located during re-execution to avoid buffer overflow bugs corrupting useful data. This memory
allocation policy is only used in the recovery mode because it wastes memory space.
(3) Allocation isolation, which places all memory buffers allocated during re-execution in an iso-
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lated location to avoid corruption useful data due to severe buffer overflow or other general mem-
ory corruption bugs. Similar to padding, it is disabled in the normal mode because it has space
overhead.
(4) Zero-filling, which zero-fills any buffers allocated during re-execution to reduce the probabil-
ity of failures caused by uninitialized reads. Obviously, this environmental change needs to be
disabled in the normal mode since it imposes time overhead.
Since none of the above changes violate memory allocation or deallocation interface specifi-
cations, they are safe to apply. At each memory allocation or free, the memory wrapper returns
exactly what the application may expect. For example, when an application asks for a memory
buffer of size N , the memory wrapper returns a buffer with at least size N , even though this buffer
may have been padded at its both ends, allocated from an isolated location, or zero-filled.
Message Wrapper Many concurrency bugs are related to message delivery such as the message
order across different connections, the size and number of network packets which comprise a
message, etc. Therefore, changing these execution environments during re-execution may be able
to avoid an occurring concurrency software bug. This is feasible because servers typically should
not have any expectation regarding the order of messages from different connections (users), the
size and the number of network packets that forms a message, especially the latter two which
depend on the TCP/IP settings of both sides.
The message wrapper, which is implemented in the proxy (described in the next subsection),
changes the message delivery environment in two ways: (1) It can randomly shuffle the order of
the requests among different connections, but keep the order of the requests within each connection
in order to maintain any possible dependency among them. (2) It can deliver messages in random-
sized packets. Such environmental changes do not impose overhead. Therefore, this message
delivery policy can be used in the normal mode, but it does not decrease the probability of the
occurrence of a concurrency bug because there is no way to predict in what way a concurrency bug
does not occur.
Process Scheduling Similarly, concurrency bugs are also related to process scheduling and are
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therefore prone to disappear if a different process scheduling is used during re-execution. Rx
does this by changing the process’ priority, and thus increasing the scheduling time quantum so a
process is less likely to switched off in the middle of some unprotected critical region.
Signal Delivery Similar to process scheduling, the time when a signal is delivered may also affect
the probability of a concurrency bug’s occurrence rate. Therefore, Rx can record all signals in a
kernel-level table before delivering them. For hardware interrupts, Rx delivers them at randomly
selected times, but preserving their order to maintain any possible ordering semantics. For software
timer signals, Rx ignores them because during rollback, the related software timer will also be
restored. For software exception related signals such as segmentation faults, Rx’s sensors receive
them as indications of software failures.
Dropping User Requests Dropping user requests is a last environmental change before switch-
ing to the whole program restart solution. As described earlier, the rationale for doing this is that
some software failures are triggered by some malformed requests, either unintentionally or inten-
tionally by malicious users. If Rx drops that request, the server will not experience failure. In
this case, the server only denies those dropped requests, but does not affect other requests. The
effectiveness of this environmental change is based on our assumption that the client and server
use a request/response model, which is generally the case for large varieties of servers including
Web Servers, DNS Servers, database servers, etc.
Rx does not need to look for the exact culprit user request. As long as the dropped requests
include this request, the server can avoid the software bug and continue providing services. Of
course, the percentage of dropped requests should be small (e.g. 10%) to avoid malicious users
exploiting it to launch denial of service attacks. Rx can achieve this by performing a binary search
on all recently received requests. First, it can drop half of them to see whether the bug still occurs
during re-execution. If not, the problem request set becomes one half smaller. If the bug still
occurs, it rolls back to drop the other half. If it still does not work, Rx resorts to the whole program
restart solution. Otherwise, the binary search continues until the percentage of dropped requests
becomes smaller than the specified number. If the percentage upper bound is set to be 10%, it only
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Figure 5.3: Proxy in normal and recovery mode. (a) In normal mode, the proxy forward re-
quest/response messages between the server and the client, buffers requests, and marks the waiting-
for-sending request for each checkpoint (e.g., req3 is marked by checkpoint 2). (b) After the server
is rolled back from the rollback-point, as shown in the dashed line to checkpoint 2, the proxy dis-
cards the mark of checkpoint 3, replays the necessary requests (req3, req4 and req5) to the server
and buffers the incoming requests (req6 and req7). The “unanswered” responses are buffered in
the response buffer.
takes 5 iterations of rollback and re-execution.
After Rx finds the small set of requests (less than the specified upper bound) that, once dropped,
enable the server to survive the bug, Rx can remember each request’s signatures such as the IP ad-
dress, message size, message MD5 hash value, etc. In subsequent times when a similar bug recurs
in the normal mode, Rx can record the signatures again. After several rounds, Rx accumulates
enough sets of signatures so that it can use statistical methods to identify the characteristics of
those bug-exposing requests. Afterward, if the same bug recurs, Rx can drop only those requests
that match these characteristics to speed up the recovery process. In addition, the second level
of defense can provide Rx with the exact signature of malicious user requests and facilitate the
recovery process.
5.3.4 Proxy
The proxy helps a failed server re-execute and makes server-side failure and recovery oblivious
to its clients. When a server fails and rolls back to a previous checkpoint, the proxy replays all
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the messages received from this checkpoint, along with the message-based environmental changes
described in the Section 5.3.3. The proxy runs as a stand-alone process in order to avoid being
corrupted by the target server’s software defects.
As Figure 5.3 shows, the Rx proxy can be in one of the two modes: normal mode for the
server’s normal execution and recovery mode during the server’s re-execution. For simplicity, the
proxy forwards and replays client messages in the granularity of user requests. Therefore, the
proxy needs to separate different requests within a stream of network messages. The proxy does
this by plugging in some simple information about the application’s communication protocol (e.g.
HTTP) so it can parse the header to separate one request from another. In addition, the proxy also
uses the protocol information to match a response to the corresponding request to avoid delivering
a response to the user twice during re-execution. In the experiments, we have evaluated four server
applications, and the proxy uses only 509 lines of code to handle 3 different protocols: HTTP,
MySQL message protocol and CVS message protocol.
As shown on Figure 5.3(a), in the normal mode, the proxy simply bridges between the server
and its clients. It keeps track of network connections and buffers the request messages between
the server and its clients in order to replay them during the server’s re-execution. It forwards client
messages at request granularity. In other words, the proxy does not forward a partial request to the
server. At a checkpoint, the proxy marks the next wait-for-forwarding request in its request buffer.
When the server needs to roll back to this checkpoint, the mark indicates the place from which the
proxy should replay the requests to the server.
The proxy does not buffer any response in the normal mode except for those partially received
responses. This is because after a full response is received, the proxy sends it out to the correspond-
ing client and mark the corresponding request as “answered”. Keeping these committed responses
is useless because during re-execution the proxy cannot send out another response for the same
request. Similarly, the proxy also strives to forward messages to clients at response granularity to
reduce the possibility of sending a self-conflicting response during re-execution, which may occur
when the first part of the response is generated by the server’s normal execution and the second
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part of the response is generated by re-execution that may take a different execution path.
However, if the response is too large to be buffered, a partial response is sent first to the corre-
sponding client but the MD5 hash for this partial response is calculated and stored with the request.
If a software failure is encountered before the proxy receives the entire response from the server,
the proxy needs to check the MD5 hash of the same partial response generated during re-execution.
If it does not match with the stored value, the proxy will drop the connection to the corresponding
client to avoid sending a self-conflicting response. To handle the case where a checkpoint is taken
in the middle of receiving a response from the server, the proxy also marks the exact position of
the partially-received response.
As shown on Figure 5.3(b), in the recovery mode, the proxy performs three functions to help
server recovery. First, it replays to the server those requests received since the checkpoint where
the server is rolled back. Second, the proxy introduces message-related environmental changes as
described in Section 5.3.3 to avoid some concurrency bugs. Third, the proxy buffers any incoming
requests from clients without forwarding them to the server until the server successfully survives
the software failure. Doing such makes the server’s failure and recovery transparent to clients,
especially since Rx has very fast recovery time as shown in Section 5.6. The proxy stays in the
recovery mode until the server survives the software failure after one or multiple iterations of
rollback and re-execution.
To deal with the output commit problem [SY85] (clients should perceive a consistent behavior
of the server despite server failures), Rx first ensures that any previous responses sent to the client
are not resent during re-execution. This is achieved by recording for each request whether it has
been responded by the server or not. If so, a response made during re-execution is dropped silently.
Otherwise, the response generated during re-execution will be temporally buffered until any of the
three conditions is met: (1) the server successfully avoids the failure via rollback and re-execution
in changed execution environments; (2) the buffer is full; or (3) this re-execution fails again. For
the first two cases, the proxy sends the buffered responses to the corresponding clients and the
corresponding requests are marked as “answered”. Thus, responses generated in subsequent re-
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execution attempts will be dropped to ensure that only one response for each request goes to the
client. For the last case, the responses are thrown away.
For applications such as on-line shopping that require strict session consistency (i.e. later
requests in the same session depend on previous responses), Rx can record the signatures (hash
values) of all committed responses for each outstanding session, and perform MD5 hash-based
consistency checks during re-execution. If a re-execution attempt generates a response that does
not match with a committed response for the same request in an outstanding session, this session
can be aborted to avoid confusing users.
The proxy also supports multiple checkpoints. When an old checkpoint is discarded, the proxy
discards the marks associated with this checkpoint. If this checkpoint is the oldest one, the proxy
also discards all the requests received before the second oldest checkpoint since the server can
never roll back to the oldest checkpoint any more.
The space overhead incurred by the proxy is small. It mainly consists of two parts: (1) space
for requests received since the undeleted oldest checkpoint, (2) space for “unanswered” responses
generated during re-execution in the recovery mode. The first part is small because usually requests
are small, and the proxy can also discard the oldest checkpoint to save space as described in
Section 5.3.2. The second part has fixed size and can be specified by administrators.
5.3.5 Control Unit
The control unit coordinates all the other components in the Rx. It performs three functions: (1)
directs the CR to checkpoint the server periodically and requests the CR to roll back the server
upon failures. (2) diagnoses an occurring failure based on the symptoms and its accumulated
experiences, then decides what environmental changes to apply and where to roll back the server.
(3) provides programmers useful failure-related information for postmortem bug analysis.
After several failures, the control unit gradually builds up a failure table to capture the recovery
experience for future reference. More specifically, during each re-execution attempt, the control
unit records the effects (success or failure) and the corresponding environmental changes into the
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table. The control unit assigns a score vector 〈s1, s2, · · · , sm〉 to each failure, where m is the
number of possible environmental changes. Each element si in the vector is the score for each cor-
responding environmental change Ci for a certain failure. For a successful re-execution, the control
unit adds one point to all the environmental changes that are applied during this re-execution. For a
failed re-execution,the control unit subtracts one point from all the applied environmental changes.
When a failure happens, the control unit searches the failure table based on failure symptoms, such
as type of exceptions, instruction counters, call chains, etc, provided by the Rx sensors. If one
table entry matches, it then applies those environmental changes whose scores are larger than a
certain threshold Ts. Otherwise, it will follow the rules described in Section 5.2 to determine the
order how environmental changes should be applied during re-execution. This failure table can be
provided to programmers for postmortem bug analysis. It is possible to borrow ideas from ma-
chine learning (e.g., a Bayesian classifier) or use some statistical methods as a more “advanced”
technique to learn what environmental changes are the best cure for a certain type of failures. Such
optimization remains as the future work.
5.4 Design and Implementation Issues
Inter-Server Communication In many real systems, servers are tiered hierarchically to provide
service. For example, a web server is usually linked to an application server, which is then linked to
a backend database server. In this case, rolling back one failed server may not be enough to survive
a failure because the failure may be caused by its front-end or back-end servers. To address this
problem, Rx should be used for all servers in this hierarchy so that it is possible to rollback a
subset or all of them in order to survive a failure. Rx can borrow many ideas, such as, coordinated
checkpointing, asynchronous recovery, etc, from previous work on supporting fault tolerance in
distributed systems [CL99, CL00, EAWJ02, RCL01, AM96], and also from recent work such as
micro-reboot [CKF+04]. More specifically, during the normal execution, Rx(s) in the tiered servers
take checkpoints coordinately. Once a failure is detected, Rx rolls back the failed server and also
87
broadcasts its rollback to Rx(s) in other correlated servers, which then roll back correspondingly
to recover the whole system. Currently, we have not implemented such support in the Rx and it
remains a topic for future study.
Multi-threaded Process Checkpointing Taking a checkpoint on a multi-threaded process is par-
ticularly challenging because, when Rx needs to take a checkpoint, some threads may be executing
system calls or could be blocked inside the kernel waiting for asynchronous events. Capturing the
transient state of such threads could easily lead to state inconsistency upon rollback. For example,
there can be some kernel locks that have been acquired during checkpoint, and rolling back to
such state may cause two processes hold the same kernel locks. Therefore, it is essential to force
all the threads to stay at the user level before checkpointing. To do so, Rx sends a signal to all
threads, which makes them exit from blocked system calls or waiting events with an EINTR return
code. After the checkpoint, the library wrapper in Rx retries the prematurely returned system calls
and thus hides the checkpointing process from the target application. This has a bearing on the
checkpointing frequency, as a high checkpointing frequency will severely impair the performance
of normal I/O system calls, which are likely to be retried multiple times (once at every checkpoint)
before long I/Os finish. Therefore, we cannot set the checkpointing interval too small.
Unavoidable Bug/Failure for Rx Even though Rx should be able to help servers recover from
most software failures caused by common software bugs such as memory corruptions and con-
currency bugs, there are still some types of bugs that Rx cannot help the server to avoid via re-
execution in changed execution environments. Resource leakage bugs, such as memory leaks,
which have accumulative effects on system and may take hours or days to cause system to crash,
cannot be avoided by only rolling the server back to a recent checkpoint. Therefore, for resource
leaking, Rx resorts to the whole program restart approach because restart can refresh server with
plenty of resources. For some of the semantic bugs, Rx may not be effective to avoid them since
they may not be related to execution environments. Finally, Rx are not able to avoid the bugs or
failures that sensors cannot detect. Solving this problem would require more rigorous dynamic
checkers as sensors.
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5.5 Evaluation Methodology
The experiments described in this section were conducted on two machines with a 2.4GHz Pentium
processor, 512KB L2 cache, 1GB of memory, and a 100Mbps Ethernet connection between them.
We run servers on one machine and clients on the other. The operating system we modified is the
Linux kernel 2.6.10. The Rx proxy is currently implemented at user level for easy debugging. In
the future, I plan to move it to the kernel level to improve performance.
We evaluate four different real-world server applications as shown in Table 5.2, including a
web server (Apache httpd), a web cache and proxy server (Squid), a database server (MySQL),
and a concurrent version control server (CVS). The servers contain various types of bugs, includ-
ing buffer overflow, data race, double free, dangling pointer, uninitialized read, and stack overflow
bugs. Four of them were introduced by the original programmers. We have not yet located server
applications which contain uninitialized read or dangling pointer bugs. To evaluate Rx’s func-
tionality of handling these two types of bugs, we inject them into Squid separately, renaming the
two Squids as Squid-ui (containing an uninitialized read bug) and Squid-dp (containing a dangling
pointer bug), respectively.
App Ver Bug #LOC App Description
MySQL 4.1.1.a data race 588K a database server
Squid 2.3.s5 buffer overflow 93K a Web proxy
Squid-ui 2.3.s5 uninitialized read cache server
Squid-dp 2.3.s5 dangling pointer
Apache 2.0.47 stack overflow 283K a Web server
CVS 1.11.4 double free 114K a version
control server
Table 5.2: Applications and bugs. (App means Application. Ver means Version. LOC means lines
of code.)
In this chapter, we design four sets of experiments to evaluate the key aspects of Rx:
• The first set evaluates the functionality of Rx in surviving software failures caused by com-
mon software defects by rollback and re-execution with environmental changes. We compare
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Rx with whole program restart in terms of client experiences during failure, and in terms of
recovery time. In addition, we also compare Rx with the simple rollback and re-execute
with no environmental changes. This approach is implemented by disabling environmental
changes in Rx.
• The second set evaluates the performance overhead of Rx for both server throughput and
average response time without bug occurrence. Additionally, we evaluate the space overhead
caused by checkpoints and the proxy.
• The third set evaluates how Rx would behave under certain degree of malicious attacks that
continuously send bug-expo-sing requests triggering buffer overflow or other software de-
fects. We measure the throughput and average response time under different bug arrival rates.
In this set of experiments, we also compare Rx with the whole program restart approach in
terms of performance.
• The fourth set evaluates the benefits of Rx’s mechanism of learning from previous failure
experiences, which are stored in the failure table to speed up recovery.
For all the servers, we implement clients in a similar manner as previous work, such as httperf [MJ98]
or WebStone [TS95], sending continuous requests over concurrent connections. For Squid and
Apache, the clients spawn 5 threads. Each thread sends out requests to fetch different files whose
sizes range in 1KB, 2KB, ..., 512KB with uniform distribution. For CVS, the client exports a
30KB source file. For MySQL, we use two loads. To trigger the data race, the client spawns 5
threads, each of them sending out begin, select, and commit requests on a small table repeatedly.
The size of individual requests must be as small as possible to maximize the probability of the race
occurring. For the overhead experiments with MySQL, a more realistic load with updates is used.
To demonstrate that Rx can avoid server failures, we use another client that sends bug-exposing
requests to those servers.
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5.6 Experimental Results
Apps Bugs Failure Environmental Clients Experience Recoverable? Average Recovery
Symptoms Changes Failure? Time (s)
Alternatives Rx Alternatives Rx Restart Rx
Squid Buffer Overflow SEGV Padding Yes No No Yes 5.113 0.095
MySQL Data Race SEGV Schedule Change Yes No 40% probablity Yes* 3.500 0.161
Apache Stack Overflow Assert Drop User Request Yes No No Yes 1.115 0.026
CVS Double Free SEGV Delay Free Yes No No Yes 0.010 0.017
Squid-ui Uninit Read SEGV Zero All Yes No No Yes 5.000 0.126
Squid-dp Dangling Pointer SEGV Delay Free Yes No No Yes 5.006 0.113
Table 5.3: Overall results: comparison of Rx and two alternative approaches. The two alternative
approaches are whole program restart, and simple rollback and re-execution without environmental
changes. The results are obtained by running each experiment 20 times. The recovery time for
the restart approach is measured by having the client not resend the bug-exposing request after
reconnection. Otherwise, the server will crash again immediately after restart. *For MySQL,
during the 20 runs, the data race bug never occur during re-execution in Rx after applying various
timing-related environmental changes.
5.6.1 Overall Results
Table 5.3 demonstrates the overall effectiveness of Rx in surviving failures. For each buggy ap-
plication, the table shows the type of bug, what symptom was used to detect the bug, and what
environmental change was eventually used to avoid the bug. The table also compares Rx to two
alternative approaches: the ordinary whole program restart solution and a simple rollback and
re-execution without environmental changes. For Rx, the checkpoint intervals in most cases are
200ms except for MySQL and CVS. For MySQL, we use a checkpoint interval of 750ms because
too frequent checkpointing causes its data race bug to disappear in the normal mode. The rea-
son for using 50ms as the checkpoint interval for CVS will be explained later when we discuss
the recovery time. The average recovery time is the recovery time averaged across multiple bug
occurrences in the same execution. Section 5.6.4 will discuss the difference in Rx recovery time
between the first time bug occurrence and subsequent bug occurrences.
As shown in Table 5.3, Rx can successfully avoid various types of common software defects,
including 5 deterministic memory bugs and 1 concurrency bug. These bugs are avoided during
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re-execution because of Rx’s environmental changes. For example, by padding buffers allocated
during re-execution, Rx can successfully avoid the buffer overflow bug in Squid. Apache survives
the stack overflow bug because Rx drops the bug-exposing user request during re-execution. Squid-
ui survives the uninitialized read bug because Rx zero-fills all buffers allocated during re-execution.
These results indicate that Rx is a viable solution to increase the availability of server applications.
In contrast, the two alternatives, restart and simple rollback/re-execution, cannot successfully
recover the three servers (Squid, Apache and CVS) that contain deterministic bugs. For the restart
approach, this is because the client notices a disconnection and tries to resend the same bug-
exposing request, which causes the server to crash again. For the simple rollback and re-execution
approach, once the server rolls back to a previous checkpoint and starts re-execution, the same
deterministic bug will occur again, causing the server to crash immediately. These two alternatives
have a 40% recovery rate for MySQL that contains a non-deterministic concurrency bug because
in 60% cases the same bug-exposing interleaving is used again after restart or rollback. Such
results show that these two alternative approaches, even though simple, cannot survive failures
caused by many common software defects and thus cannot provide continuous services. The results
also indicate that applying environmental changes is the key reason why Rx can survive software
failures caused by common software defects, especially deterministic bugs.
Because the Rx’s proxy hides the server failure and recovery process from its clients, clients
do not experience any failures. In contrast, with restart, clients experience failures due to broken
network connections. To be fault tolerant, clients need to reconnect to the server and reissue all
unreplied requests. With the simple rollback and re-execution, since the server cannot recover from
the failure, clients eventually time out and thus experience server failures.
Table 5.3 also shows that Rx provides a significantly better (21-53 times faster) recovery time
than restart except for CVS. This is because rollback is a lightweight and fine-grained action due
to the in-memory checkpoints. Also, as we find that most faults are detected promptly (usually
by crashing), Rx rarely needs to roll back the program further than the recent checkpoint. This
minimizes the amount of re-execution necessary. Furthermore, since the program is starting from
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a recent execution state, it is unnecessary to initialize data structures or to warm up buffer caches
from disks. In contrast, restart is much slower. This is because restart requires the program to be
reloaded and reinitialized from the beginning. Any memory state such as buffer caches and data
structures need to be warmed up or initialized. Squid is a particularly clear example. For Squid,
restart requires 5.113 seconds to recover from a crash, whereas Rx takes only 0.095 seconds. Since
the experiments use only a small workload, we expect that, with a real world workload, it will take
an even longer time for the whole program restart approach to recovery from failures because it
requires a long time to warm up caches and other memory data structures. This result indicates that
Rx enables servers to provide highly available services despite common software defects. Instead
of experiencing a failure, clients experience an increased response time for a very short period. We
expect that after the Rx’s proxy is pushed into the kernel, the Rx results will be even better since
such optimization will reduce the number of context switches and memory coping overhead.
If the bug-exposing request is not resent after failure, restart has similar recovery time for CVS
(otherwise, restart cannot recover the failure for CVS). Restart takes only .01 seconds to recover
for CVS, while Rx takes .017 seconds. This is because CVS is implemented using the xinetd
daemon as its network monitor. Each connection to CVS causes xinetd to fork and exec a new
instance of CVS. Therefore, CVS must have a very low startup time in order to provide adequate
performance. Additionally, there is no state shared between different CVS processes except for
that of the repository, which is persistently stored on disk. As such, CVS has only minimal state
to initialize. Given such a simple application, ordinary restart technique are good enough. For
the same reason, even when Rx takes a checkpoint every 50ms, the overhead is still small, less
than 11%. But even with such frequent checkpoints, Rx’s recovery time is still slightly higher than
restart, which indicates for CVS-like servers, restart is a better alternative in terms of recovery
time. But note that restart is not failure transparent to clients, and, if the bug-exposing request is
resent again by the client after the failure, the same bug (especially deterministic one) is very likely
to happen again.
Rx does not hide software defects. Instead, Rx reacts only after a defect is exposed. In addition,
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Figure 5.4: Throughput and average response time of Squid. Run squid with Rx and Restart for
one bug occurrence (Between time period (7,11.5), there are no measurements for restart because
no requests are responded during this period.)
Rx’s failure and recovery experiences provide programmers with extra information to diagnose the
occurring or occurred software defects. For example, for CVS, Rx is able to avoid the bug by
delaying the recycling of recently freed buffers during re-execution. Programmers then should
investigate more in the direction of double-free or dangling pointers.
5.6.2 Recovery Performance
We have compared Rx with restart in terms of performance during recovery. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.4, Rx maintains throughput levels close to that of the baseline case. At the time of bug
occurrence (at 7 seconds from the very beginning), the server throughput drops by 33% and the
average response time increases by a factor of two for only a very short period of time (17-161
milliseconds). Therefore, a bug occurrence imposes only a small overhead, and has a minimal
impact on overall throughput and response time. Restart, on the other hand, has a 5 second period
of zero throughput. It services no requests during this period, so there are no measurements for
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Figure 5.5: Throughput and average response time with different bug arrival rates
response time. Once Squid has restarted, there is a spike in response time because all of the clients
get their requests satisfied after a long queuing delay. Because Squid cannot service requests until
it has completed the lengthy startup and initialization process, the whole program restart approach
significantly degrades the performance upon a failure. Similarly, with a large real-world workload,
we expect that the performance with restart will be even worse since the recovery time will become
longer and many more requests will be queued, waiting to be serviced.
Figure 5.5 further illustrates the Rx’s performance in the case of continuous attacks by ma-
licious users who keep issuing bug-exposing requests. The throughput and response time of Rx
remain constant as the rate of bug occurrences increases, whereas the performance of restart de-
grades rapidly. This is because Rx has very small recovery time, while restart spends a long time
in recovery. Therefore, if such a bug were triggered by an Internet-wide worm [SPW02] or a
malicious user, restart cannot cope. However, since Rx can deal with higher bug arrival rates, Rx
can tolerate such attacks much better.
5.6.3 Rx Time and Space Overhead
Figure 5.6 shows the overhead of Rx compared to the baseline (without Rx) for various frequencies
of checkpointing. The performance of Rx degrades somewhat as the checkpoint interval decreases,
but the amount of degradation is small. For squid, both throughput and response time are very close
to baseline for all tested checkpoint rates. This is because the network remains the bottleneck for
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Figure 5.6: Rx overhead with different checkpoint intervals The overhead is in terms of throughput
and average response time for Squid and MySQL. In these experiments, we do not send the bug-
exposing request since we want to compare the pure overhead of Rx with the baseline in normal
cases.
all cases. For MySQL, the performance degrades slightly at small checkpoint intervals. Since
MySQL is more CPU bound, the additional memory-copying imposed by frequent checkpoints
causes some degradation. It is expected that as checkpoints are taken extremely frequently, Rx’s
overhead will become dominant. However, there is no need for very frequent checkpointing. As
shown earlier, even when Rx checkpoints every 200 milliseconds, it is able to provide very good
recovery performance. With such a checkpoint interval, the overhead imposed by Rx is quite small,
almost negligible for Squid and only 5% for MySQL.
Table 5.4 shows the average memory space overhead of Rx per checkpoint. The space overhead
of Rx for each checkpoint is relatively small (45.11-463.60kB). It mainly comes from two parts:
updates made during the checkpoint interval and the proxy message buffers. For the first part, Rx
uses copy-on-write to reduce space overhead. For the second part, since Rx only records requests
in the normal mode and request sizes are usually small, the proxy does not occupy much memory
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Apps Rx Space Overhead (kB/checkpoint)
kernel proxy total
Squid 405.35 3.70 409.05
Mysql 300.00 0.16 300.16
Apache 460.00 3.60 463.60
CVS 42.22 2.89 45.11
Table 5.4: The average space overhead per checkpoint
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Figure 5.7: Rx recovery time for the first and subsequent bug occurrences
per checkpoint. Therefore, if 2-3MB of space can be used by Rx, Rx is able to maintain 5-20
checkpoints: enough for our recovery purpose.
5.6.4 Benefits of the Failure Table
Figure 5.7 reports the server recovery time with Rx when the server encounters the bug for the first
time and for subsequent times in the same run. The results show that the failure table can effectively
reduce the recovery time when the same bug/failure occurs again. For example, to deal with the
first time occurrence of the buffer overflow bug in Squid, Rx applies message reordering, delaying
free + message reordering, padding + message reordering sequentially in three consecutive re-
execution trials, and finally avoid the bug at the third re-execution. The entire recovery process lasts
around 216.7 milliseconds. However, for any subsequent occurrences of the same bug, which can
be located in the failure table, Rx applies the correct environmental changes (padding + message
reordering) in the first re-execution attempt, thus the recovery time is reduced to 94.7 milliseconds.
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For CVS, the failure table also helps to reduce the recovery time from 25 milliseconds to 16.9
milliseconds. For MySQL, the data race bug is avoided at the very first try with message reordering
and therefore there is no difference between the first bug occurrence and subsequent ones.
5.7 Summary
In summary, Rx is a safe, non-invasive and informative method for quickly surviving software
failures caused by common software bugs such as memory corruptions and concurrency bugs and
thus providing highly available services. It does so by re-executing the buggy program region in a
modified execution environment. It can deal with both deterministic and non-deterministic bugs,
and requires few to no modifications to applications’ source code. Because Rx does not forcefully
change programs’ execution by returning speculative values, it introduces no uncertainty or mis-
behavior into programs’ execution. Moreover, it provides additional feedback to programmers for
their bug diagnosis.
The experiments with four server applications that contain six bugs of different types show
that Rx can successfully avoid software defects during re-execution and thus provide non-stop
services. In contrast, the two tested alternatives, a whole program restart approach and a simple
rollback and re-execution without environmental changes, cannot recover the three servers (Squid,
Apache and CVS) that contain deterministic bugs, and only have a 40% recovery rate for the
server (MySQL) that contains a non-deterministic concurrency bug. These results indicate that
applying environmental changes is crucial to survive software failures caused by common software
defects, especially deterministic bugs. In addition, Rx also provides fast recovery within 0.017-
0.16 seconds, 21-53 times faster than the whole program restart approach for all but one case
(CVS). With Rx, clients do not experience any failures except a small increase in the average
response time for a very short period of time. To provide such fast recovery, Rx imposes small
time and small space overheads.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
To effectively improve software dependability during production runs, this dissertation proposes
multi-level defenses for addressing software bugs with support from the hardware, OS, and run-
time. Satisfying the desired characteristics imposed by online detection/surviving systems, the
proposed methods incur low runtime overhead, require no source code modification, and have no
hardware extension.
In the first-level defense, detecting software bugs once they are triggered, this dissertation
proposes a low-overhead, software-only tool, SafeMem, to detect memory leaks and memory cor-
ruption bugs, two major forms of software bugs that severely threaten system availability and se-
curity. SafeMem makes a novel use of existing ECC memory technology to provide low-overhead,
fine-grained memory monitoring functionality to user-level applications. Combined with the pro-
posed intelligent dynamic memory usage behavior analysis, SafeMem can detect memory leaks
and corruptions with very low overhead (only 1.6%-14.4% in the experiments) and few to no false
positives.
In the second-level defense, detecting exploitation of software bugs if the first-level defense
misses them, this dissertation proposes a low-overhead, software-only information flow tracking
system, called LIFT, to detect various types of security attacks. Without requiring any hardware
changes, LIFT minimizes runtime overhead by exploiting dynamic binary translation and opti-
mizations. More specifically, LIFT aggressively eliminates unnecessary dynamic information flow
tracking, coalesces information checks, and efficiently switches between target programs and in-
strumented information flow tracking code. The experiments show that LIFT effectively detects
various types of security attacks and incurs low overhead, only 6.2% for server applications, and
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3.6 times on average for seven SPEC INT 2000 applications. The proposed dynamic optimizations
effectively reduce the overhead by a factor of 5-12 times.
In the third-level defense, surviving software bugs or failures once reported by the first two
level defenses, this dissertation proposes an innovative safe technique, called Rx, to quickly recover
programs from many types of software bugs, both deterministic and non-deterministic. The idea,
inspired from allergy treatment in real life, is to roll back the program to a recent checkpoint
once failure, triggering or exploitation of software bugs that are detected in the first two levels of
defenses, and then re-execute the program in a modified environment. The idea is based on the
observation that many bugs are correlated with their execution environments, and therefore can
be avoided by removing the “allergen” from the environment. The experiments with four server
applications that contain six bugs of various types show that Rx can survive all the six software
failures and provide transparent fast recovery within 0.017-0.16 seconds, 21-51 times faster than
the whole system program restart approach for all but one case (CVS).
This dissertation made contributions to improve software dependability during production runs,
a very crucial problem. However, many open problems are left as future work.
One problem is caused by the scalability. Currently the proposed tools work well with single-
node systems, but issues still remain open for large-scale distributed systems such as Google search
engine. For example, how to identify failed nodes among hundreds of thousands of servers? How
to effectively survive failures which are correlated among multiple servers in different hierarchy?
To answer these questions, we may borrow ideas like coordinated checkpointing and asynchronous
recovery from previous work on supporting fault tolerance in distributed systems.
Rx can potentially tolerate concurrency bugs by manipulating the execution environment. How-
ever, how to effectively detect or even prevent the potential concurrency bugs is a difficult and
critical problem. Especially with CMP and SMT architectures becoming the mainstream, more
and more multi-threaded applications are being written in order to take advantage of the available
processors. Consequently, one can expect an increasing number of concurrency bugs in the near
future.
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This dissertation does not address semantic bugs during production runs. It does not mean
there is no such bugs during production runs. A possible research direction is to provide system
support for model checking methods to detect hidden semantic bugs during production runs.
Addressing software bugs to improve dependability is part of the answers for the whole de-
pendability problem. Configuration error is another major cause of system failures. How can we
use system support to address configuration errors? How to prevent, detect, or tolerate configura-
tion errors? They are interesting and also must-be-solved problems in order to improve software
dependability in the real world.
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